Dynamic Regulatory Constitutionalism: Taking Legislation Seriously in the Judicial Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights by Stacey, Richard
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 31 | Issue 1 Article 3
2017
Dynamic Regulatory Constitutionalism: Taking
Legislation Seriously in the Judicial Enforcement of
Economic and Social Rights
Richard Stacey
University of Toronto
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons,
Constitutional Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International Humanitarian Law
Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Juvenile Law Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more information, please
contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard Stacey, Dynamic Regulatory Constitutionalism: Taking Legislation Seriously in the Judicial Enforcement of Economic and Social
Rights, 31 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 85 (2017).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol31/iss1/3
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\31-1\NDE103.txt unknown Seq: 1 12-JUL-17 14:53
DYNAMIC REGULATORY CONSTITUTIONALISM:
TAKING LEGISLATION SERIOUSLY IN THE
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
RICHARD STACEY*
INTRODUCTION
The international human rights revolution in the decades after the
Second World War recognized economic and social rights alongside
civil and political rights.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1949, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights in 1966, regional treaties, and subject-specific treaties variously
describe rights to food, shelter, health, and education, and set out state
obligations for the treatment of children.  When they first appeared,
these international, economic, and social rights instruments raised
questions about whether economic and social rights are justiciable in
domestic legal contexts and whether they can be meaningfully enforced
by courts in the same way as civil and political rights.1  Today, however,
constitutions all over the world place economic and social rights along-
side civil and political rights in their bills of rights.2  The ‘first wave’
* Assistant Professor, University of Toronto Faculty of Law.  The author would like
to thank Philip Alston, David Dyzenhaus, Helen Hershkoff, Lisa Kerr, Christopher
McCrudden, Brian Ray, Kate O’Regan, Kent Roach, Wojciech Sadurski, David Schneider-
man, Jeremy Waldron, and Jacob Weinrib for helpful discussions during the preparation
of this paper.
1. For the debate about the justiciability of economic and social rights, mostly dur-
ing the period of constitutional reconstruction in the aftermath of the Cold War and
South Africa’s emergence from apartheid, see, e.g., Nicholas Haysom, Constitutionalism,
Majoritarian Democracy and Socio-Economic Rights, 8 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 451 (1992); Cass
Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, in WESTERN RIGHTS? POST-COMMUNIST APPLICATION 225
(Andra´s Sajo´ ed., Kluwer Law International 1996); STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES (W.W. Norton 1999); Craig Scott &
Patrick Macklem, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a New
South African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1992).
2. See, e.g., TORONTO INITIATIVE FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (2010), http://
www.tiesr.org/data.html (measuring the presence or absence of seventeen distinct eco-
nomic and social rights in 136 national constitutions around the world; the dataset also
codes the status of these rights as justiciable or aspirational).
In the United States, while the federal U.S. Constitution recognizes no economic and
social rights, all fifty state constitutions guarantee some degree of protection for eco-
nomic and social rights. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The
Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (1999) [hereinafter
Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions]; Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”: Common
Law and the Enforcement of State Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1521, 1523–26 (2010); Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State Courts and Constitu-
tional Socio-Economic Rights: Exploring the Underutilization Thesis, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 923,
927–30 (2011) [hereinafter Hershkoff & Loffredo, State Courts and Constitutional Socio-
Economic Rights].  The new Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2014, sets out
85
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debate about justiciability has been replaced by pragmatic considera-
tions of how economic and social rights can or should be enforced, and
what role courts, legislatures, and the executive and administrative
branches should play in achieving them.3
My objective here is to point out that much of this second wave of
economic and social rights jurisprudence suffers from a lack of atten-
tion to the normative content of the ‘social legislation’ enacted to give
effect to economic and social rights.  I argue that scholars and courts
have in the first place ignored how social legislation encodes the com-
mitments a legal community makes to social justice in constitutional-
ized economic and social rights.  In the second place, scholars and
courts have paid insufficient attention to the role that social legislation
plays in communicating constitutional norms of social justice to the
government officials responsible for the administration of the state.
This lack of attention runs through all four of the dominant mod-
els that have emerged for the judicial enforcement of economic and
social rights: structural injunctions and ‘strong remedies;’4 the mini-
mum core doctrine;5 the ‘administrative law’ model;6 and the ‘catalytic
court’ approach.7  Comparative analysis of high court judgments
around the world that have relied on one or other of these models of
adjudication both confirms the inattention to constitutional norms and
emphasizes the limits of adjudication that is inattentive to these norms.8
This inattention to normativity carries the risks, first, that official efforts
to realize rights will come to be characterized by a regulatory formalism
focused on compliance with the letter of the legislation without con-
rights to a number of socio-economic resources like housing, sufficient food and clean
water, health care, social security, and education.  The Tunisian Constitution, 2014,
includes a similar catalogue of rights to socio-economic resources, and while previous
drafts of the Tunisian Constitution differed on issues like the structure of government
and the composition of the legislature, the commitment to economic and social rights
has remained constant throughout.
3. David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 189,
193–96 (2012) [hereinafter Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement].
4. Id.
5. DAVID BILCHITZ, POVERTY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: THE JUSTIFICATION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS (Oxford Univ. Press 2007); David Bilchitz,
Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations for Future Socio-
Economic Rights Jurisprudence, 19 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Bilchitz,
Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core]; David Bilchitz, Giving Socio-Economic
Rights Teeth: The Minimum Core and Its Importance, 119 S. AFR. L.J. 484 (2002) [hereinafter
Bilchitz, Giving Socio-Economic Rights Teeth].
6. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO (Oxford
Univ. Press 2001) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY].
7. KATHARINE G. YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (Oxford
Univ. Press 2012).
8. I rely on methods of comparative constitutional law described and employed, for
example, in Armin von Bogdandy, Comparative Constitutional Law: A Contested Domain, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Michel Rosenfeld &
Andra´s Sajo´ eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2012); Mark Tushnet, The Rise of Weak-Form Review, in
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., Edward Elgar
2011); Dennis M. Davis, Socio-economic rights: has the promise of eradicating the divide between
first and second generation rights been fulfilled?, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Tom
Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., Edward Elgar 2011).
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cern for the deeper constitutional objectives that drive it, and second,
that officials unconcerned with constitutional commitments will require
constant and persistent supervision by courts in the pursuit of eco-
nomic and social rights.
I propose a theory of judicial engagement with economic and
social rights that pays closer attention to the place of legislation and fills
this gap in the existing approaches.  At the cornerstone of this new per-
spective is the idea of ‘normative congruence,’ an adaptation of Lon
Fuller’s rule-of-law principle of congruence.9  The heart of the idea is
that government and official conduct must remain congruent not only
with the formal rules and limits of legislation, but also with the constitu-
tional commitments that provide the normative foundations of these
statutory and regulatory rules.  I do not suggest that this idea replaces
any of the four existing models of judicial enforcement of economic
and social rights; I am not offering an alternative model of economic
and social rights adjudication.
Rather, I suggest that courts’ enforcement of economic and social
rights, through whichever of the existing models is most appropriate in
the circumstances, should be aimed at achieving normative congru-
ence.  By engaging with recalcitrant administrators and officials in an
ongoing dialogue aimed at leading government officials, administra-
tors, and regulators to a clear understanding of how constitutional com-
mitments inflect the specific rules that direct and constrain their
behavior, courts can return the focus of regulatory and administrative
action to fundamental constitutional norms.  I call this ‘dynamic regula-
tory constitutionalism.’  It is dynamic because it calls on courts and offi-
cials to develop an understanding of what the law requires of the state,
through an iterative and active engagement with each other.  And it is a
regulatory form of constitutionalism because it seeks to infuse constitu-
tional values into the usually mundane, mechanical, and formalized
functions of the administrative state.
Dynamic regulatory constitutionalism aims to return the focus to
the constitutionally entrenched, normative content of social legislation
in two ways.  First, courts must emphasize the constitutional founda-
tions of social legislation, articulating clearly how constitutional norms
infuse the regulatory obligations that administrators bear.  Focusing on
the connections between constitutional values and the terms of positive
law illustrates how compliance with the substantive content of positive
law advances the constitutional commitment to social justice.  The cases
I discuss in this paper show this principle in action–in right-to-water
litigation in South Africa, the substantive rule intended to realize the
right to have access to sufficient water was the City of Johannesburg’s
policy of providing 6000 liters of water per household per month free
of charge;10 in Colombia the content of several economic and social
rights in the context of internally displaced people (IDPs) came from
9. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (revised ed., Yale Univ. Press 1969).
10. Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2009 (4) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter
Mazibuko].
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Colombia’s international law commitments to IDPs;11 and in New York
the common-law standard of ‘habitability’ gave content to state welfare
rights.12
Second, judicial engagement with officials must be aimed at deter-
mining whether the latter do indeed understand the connections
between constitutional commitments and positive social legislation.
The cases I consider here suggest that where courts pay no attention to
whether officials have a clear understanding of how the statutory rules
they are charged with implementing advance or fulfill commitments to
economic and social rights, the administrative recalcitrance giving rise
to litigation in the first place may continue despite judicial intervention.
The perspective that dynamic regulatory constitutionalism brings
recognizes that courts do not hold a monopoly over the project of
rights fulfillment, but are partners with all the institutions of state in
that project.  When the legislature takes steps to translate constitutional
rights into a regulatory program, the courts’ role must be to ensure that
the officials charged with implementing that program are committed
to, or at least appreciate, the constitutional imperatives behind the reg-
ulatory system.
In Part I of this paper, I review the four dominant models for the
judicial enforcement of economic and social rights, arguing that each
of them ignores the constitutional normativity of positive legislation.  In
Part II, I introduce the idea of normative congruence as a device that
brings theoretical perspective to the blind spot in these existing
approaches.  Relying on a conception of social legislation as a tool for
intra-governmental communication, I explore how the idea of norma-
tive congruence lays a foundation for dynamic regulatory constitution-
alism and guides courts, legislatures, and administrative officials in
enforcing social legislation.  I describe a number of important decisions
from Argentina, Colombia, South Africa, and the United States in this
part of the paper, using them as examples of where dynamic regulatory
constitutionalism has made a significant contribution to the advance-
ment of economic and social rights, and where the failure to engage in
dynamic regulatory constitutionalism has led to the problems and fail-
ures I advert to in Part I of the paper.
I. THE GAP IN EXISTING MODELS OF ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION
It is necessary at the outset to define the scope of this paper.  My
argument is that in the cases where social legislation has already been
enacted to give life to economic and social rights, courts should adopt a
perspective that pays due regard to this legislation.  I leave aside the
problem of legislative inaction, where an executive or legislature makes
no statutory or regulatory moves in the direction of protecting and
11. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], enero 22, 2004, Sentencia
T-025/04, M. Espinosa, Expediente T-653010 (Colom.) http://www.corteconstitucional
.gov.co/relatoria/2004/t-025-04.htm.
12. McCain v. Koch, 484 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
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advancing economic and social rights.  Bearing in mind that the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as
various domestic constitutions frame rights in a way that places an obli-
gation on the government to take steps toward the progressive realiza-
tion of economic and social rights, including in particular the
enactment of legislation, the full realization of these rights will likely
involve legislation.13  Were a state to take no steps and pass no legisla-
tion to this end, it would likely be in violation of its obligations in terms
of any economic and social rights recognized in its legal order.  The
South African Constitutional Court has held that in these circumstances
the courts may order a government to take steps, including the passage
of legislation, to fulfill these obligations.14  Similarly, it cannot be the
case that economic and social rights remain inchoate and unenforce-
able until legislation for their advancement is passed.15
But whatever the constitutional implications of legislative inaction,
this paper concerns only the situations in which legislation does estab-
lish a framework for the pursuit of social and economic rights and
argues that insufficient attention to the link between legislation and
fundamental constitutional norms threatens to undermine the efforts
of a committed legislature to realize economic and social rights.
I begin by describing how each of the four dominant models of
economic and social rights adjudication suffer from precisely this lack
of attention to legislation.  An explanation for this myopia, at least in
the first three approaches, is that they developed during the first wave
of economic and social rights jurisprudence when the primary concern
was to demonstrate the justiciability and enforceability of economic and
social rights.  In advocating justiciability, each of these models considers
whether rights should be conceived as either strong or weak, and in
13. See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV.
203 (2008); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
78–79 (Basic Books 1983) (arguing that welfare rights gain substance only when a legal
community adopts some program of provision).
14. Mazibuko, supra note 10, at para. 67.  The question of what courts can do in the R
face of legislative torpor with respect to the advancement of access to socio-economic
resources is different to the question of whether a government’s or legislature’s actions
infringe existing access to or enjoyment of socio-economic resources.  Aside from the
positive obligation they impose on the state, economic and social rights carry a negative
obligation to ensure that legislation or other state conduct does not reduce existing
access to socio-economic resources like health care, education, housing, food and water,
or social security.  Any such action would infringe these rights and could for that reason
be struck down by courts.  The negative protection of economic and social rights does not
require positive legislation. See Jaftha v. Schoeman 2004 (2) SA 140 (CC) (S. Afr.).
15. For reliance on this argument with respect to the right to sufficient water in
South Africa, for example, see Manqele v. Durban Transitional Metropolitan Council 2002 (6)
SA 423 (D) (S. Afr.) (holding the right to water unenforceable in the absence of regula-
tions defining the right of access to a basic water supply); and for criticism see Malcolm
Langford & Richard Stacey, Water, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 35–37 (Stu-
art Woolman & Michael Bishop eds., Juta 2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter Langford & Stacey,
Water].  Amartya Sen, in this vein, recognizes a distinction between human rights and the
legislation intended to advance human rights, but questions whether human rights are
‘entirely parasitic’ on legislation. See Amartya Sen, Human Rights and the Limits of Law, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2913, 2915 (2006).
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advocating enforceability, each describes either strong or weak
remedies.16
Courts preferring strong rights and strong remedies responded
favorably to ‘institutional reform litigation’ and have tended to impose
structural injunctions on organs of state.  A second ‘strong rights’ view
is the minimum core doctrine which argues that economic and social
rights should be understood to include a floor of socio-economic
resources, the provision of which is the state’s duty.  The third
approach adopts a weaker view of rights; the ‘administrative law model’
allows that officials need take only the steps that are reasonable, in the
circumstances, to fulfill rights.  The fourth approach suggests that a
‘catalytic’ court should choose from among a range of approaches in
enforcing economic and social rights, conditioned on the modality of
the government’s failure to uphold rights.17  This approach encom-
passes what has been described as the ‘new Commonwealth model’18 of
rights adjudication, involving ‘conversation’ or ‘dialogue’ between
courts and other branches of government about the meaning of rights,
alongside ‘experimental’19 models of holding officials to their obliga-
tions.  I turn now to a more detailed account of this gap in each of the
four dominant models of economic and social rights adjudication.
A. Institutional Reform Litigation and ‘Strong’ Remedies
One method of enforcing economic and social rights is the judicial
imposition of strong remedies against the state.  Interdicts or structural
injunctions give clear and specific instructions to officials, sometimes in
the form of consent decrees confirming an agreement between the par-
ties as to how rights-violating conduct will be brought to an end.20  In
policing these orders, courts may maintain jurisdiction and require par-
ties to report back to the court on their progress in meeting orders.
Structural injunctions are often the result of institutional reform litiga-
tion (or ‘IRL’) aimed at judicially mandated reforms to the structures
of the public authorities whose conduct or inactivity infringes rights.
IRL emerged prominently in the USA in response to administrative
lethargy in school desegregation following the order in Brown v. Board
16. The typology of judicial approaches to economic and social rights enforcement
is usefully summarized by Katharine Young, in her recent book, see YOUNG, supra note 7. R
The foundations of this typology are laid in MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG
RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (Princeton Univ. Press 2008).
17. YOUNG, supra note 7. R
18. Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J.
COMP. L. 707 (2001).
19. For experimental approaches, see Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon,
Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53 (2011) [herein-
after Sabel & Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State]; Charles F.
Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004) [hereinafter Sabel & Simon, Destabilization Rights].
20. ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS
WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT (Yale Univ. Press 2003).
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of Education,21 and in attempts to remedy dysfunction in the public
management of prisons.22  It is a response to the recognition that the
judicial vindication of a right does not necessarily lead to changes in the
social and administrative institutions responsible for rights violations.23
A remedy to the ongoing injustice of segregated schooling, as opposed
to a single case of racial discrimination, requires dismantling the system
of segregated schooling in its entirety.
Where the underlying structural problems that give rise to eco-
nomic and social rights claims are not addressed, courts are likely to
face numerous individual applications for remedies.  The roll of a sym-
pathetic court can quickly become clogged with individual claims stem-
ming from the same structural defect.  The Colombian tutela, a rule of
standing introduced in the Political Constitution of Colombia of 1991,
allows individual claims against the state for the violation of constitu-
tional rights.  It was used just 10,732 times in 1992 in protection of the
right to health, but over 130,000 times in 2001.24  By 2003 over half of
21. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22. See, e.g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975) (in regard to
school desegregation); see also Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1976); Finney v.
Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Ark. 1976); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex.
1980) (in regard to prison reform).  On institutional reform litigation more generally, see
Ross Sandler & David Schoenbrod, The Supreme Court, Democracy and Institutional Reform
Litigation, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 915 (2005) [hereinafter Sandler & Schoenbrod, The
Supreme Court]; Ross Sandler & David Schoenbrod, From Status to Contract and Back Again:
Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation, 27 REV. LITIG. 115 (2007) [hereinafter San-
dler & Schoenbrod, From Status to Contract and Back Again]; SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra
note 20; Leonard Koerner, Institutional Reform Litigation, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 509 R
(2009); Darren Hutchinson, Social Movements and Judging: An Essay on Institutional Reform
Litigation and Desegregation in Dallas, Texas, 62 S.M.U. L. REV. 1635 (2009); MALCOLM M.
FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW
COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (Cambridge Univ. Press 1998).
23. See Mark Tushnet’s work in Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV.
1363 (1984); Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 S.M.U. L. REV. 23 (1993); and his
more recent book bringing many of these ideas to bear on social welfare specifically,
TUSHNET, supra note 16. See also STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, R
PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (Univ. of Michigan Press 2d ed. 2004); DUNCAN
KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE (Harvard Univ. Press 1997).  Gerald
Rosenberg’s study of the social and political impact of the US Supreme Court’s decision
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) is an example of this kind of criticism.
See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE
(Univ. of Chicago Press 2d ed. 2008).
24. The Political Constitution of Colombia of 1991 confers a catalogue of economic
and social rights in Chapter 2.  This catalogue includes rights to social assistance (art. 48),
health services and sanitation (art. 49), decent housing (art. 51), and education (art. 67).
Although these rights are not ‘fundamental’ in the schema of the Constitution, the Con-
stitutional Court has used the doctrine of connection to hold that when economic and
social rights are closely enough connected to fundamental rights, they should be
enforced as such.  Corte Constitucional [CC] [Constitutional Court], octubre 26, 1992,
Sentencia T-571/92, M. Grieffenstein, Expediente T-2635 (Colomb.), http://www.corte
constitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1992/t-571-92.htm.  By 2008, however, the Court had
abandoned this artificial distinction between rights, preferring to consider which aspects
of fundamental rights, to health for example, are immediately enforceable and which are
subject to progressive realization.  Corte Constitucional [CC] [Constitutional Court],
julio 31, 2008, Sentencia T-760/08, M. Espinosa (Colom.) http://www.corteconstitucion
al.gov.co/relatoria/2008/t-760-08.htm.
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the Colombian Constitutional Court’s docket was consumed by tutelas
alleging violations of rights to health care and social assistance.25  As
one Colombian judge remarked, “[w]e were the bureaucracy.”26  The
courts had become a substitute for regulation.27
In South Africa, individual claims based on the right to social assis-
tance have been overwhelming.  Judges have become frustrated both
with the ‘depressing tales of misery and privation’ that clog the court
rolls and with the unsatisfactory performance of government depart-
ments and agencies in administering social assistance programs.28
Argentina’s experience with right-to-health litigation has been similar.
Constitutional reforms in 1994 strengthened the right to health by giv-
ing international human rights instruments domestic constitutional sta-
tus, and imposed obligations on the legislature to pass legislation
consistent with a social justice agenda and to provide health benefits on
an equal basis.29  Like Colombia’s tutela, Argentina’s amparo enables
individual and collective claims for the injunctive protection of rights.
Some of this litigation has focused on access to HIV/AIDS treatment, in
the context of a national law adopted specifically to combat the dis-
ease.30  In the landmark Benghalensis judgment in 1996, the Argentine
courts issued an injunction requiring officials to follow specific steps in
complying with the law.31  Problems of non-compliance persisted until
2010, with courts adjudicating complaints on an individual basis instead
of considering underlying or systemic faults generating official non-
compliance.32
25. Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, supra note 3, at 210-11; Alicia Ely R
Yamin & Oscar Parra-Vera, Judicial Protection of the Right to Health in Colombia: From Social
Demands to Individual Claims to Public Debates, 33 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 431, 436
(2010).
26. Manuel Jose´ Cepeda, quoted in Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement,
supra note 3, at 224. R
27. Id. at 215.
28. Vumazonke v. MEC for Social Development and Welfare for Eastern Cape Province 2004
ZAECHC 40, ECJ 050/2004 at para. 2 (S. Afr.).  Some of the judgments referred to here
are Mbanga v. MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another 2002 (1) SA 359 (SE) (S. Afr.);
Ndevu v. MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape and Another, unreported, SECLD case no. 597/02 (S.
Afr.); and Somyani v. MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape and Another, unreported, SECLD case
no. 1144/01 (S. Afr.).
29. Art. 4, CONSTITUCION NACIONAL §§ 75(22), 75(19) (Arg.).  The right to health is
independently protected by §§ 41 and 42, providing for rights to a healthful and balanced
environment and, ‘[a]s regards consumption’ of goods and services, the right to the pro-
tection of health, safety and economic interests.
30. Law No. 23798, Sept. 14, 1990, [26972] B.O. 2 (Arg.).
31. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacio´n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of
Justice], 1/7/2000, “Asociacio´n Benghalensis y Otros v. Ministerio de Salud y Accio´n
Social –Estado Nacional s/Amparo Ley 16.986,” Fallos (2000-321-1684) (Arg.) [hereinaf-
ter Asociacio´n Benghalensis y Otros]. For analysis see Paola Bergallo, Courts and Social
Change: Lessons from the Struggle to Universalize Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment in Argentina, 89
TEX. L. REV. 1611, 1626–28 (2010); see also Victor Abramovich & Laura Pautassi, Judicial
Activism in the Argentine Health System: Recent Trends, 10 HEALTH & Hum. Rts. 53 (2008).
32. Bergallo, supra note 31, at 1637–38.  With respect to a similar problem in right-
to-health litigation in Brazil, see Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, The Right to Health in the Courts
of Brazil: Worsening Health Inequities?, 11 HEALTH & Hum. Rts. 33 (2009).
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1. The Structural Causes of Rights Violations
IRL aims to get at the systemic causes of these regulatory failures
and seeks structural injunctions from courts to compel large-scale regu-
latory change rather than the vindication of rights in particular cases.
Characteristic features of these injunctions are their detail, complexity,
and the comprehensive manner in which they seek to control adminis-
trative behavior.  They have roots in U.S. civil rights litigation in the
1970s,33 while more recently and further afield, structural injunctions
have been deployed in the enforcement of economic and social rights.
In a High Court case in South Africa in 2011, the Eastern Cape Provin-
cial Department of Education admitted its non-fulfillment of the right
to education in providing only mud-walled schoolhouses for school
pupils.  An agreement laying out a very detailed plan for the resolution
of the problem was reached, laying out precisely how and when funds
are to be spent and describing in detail the specifications of temporary
measures to be taken.34  The agreement requires the provincial and
national governments to file reports with the applicants’ attorneys every
four months, detailing the steps taken in fulfillment of the agreement
and steps yet to be taken.35
Both the Colombian and South African Constitutional Courts have
in recent years issued orders that set out in great detail the steps the
government and its agents must take in providing housing for indigent
or displaced persons36 and in providing health care services.37  In
33. In the early 1970s, a federal district court in Alabama made an order setting out
detailed guidelines for housing inmates of state mental institutions: patients were to be
bathed every twelve hours, one toilet was to be provided for every eight patients, room
temperatures were to be kept between sixty-eight and eighty-three degrees Fahrenheit,
hot tap water was to be 100 degrees, dining-room floor space was to be provided on the
basis of ten square feet per patient, day-room space on the basis of forty square feet per
patient, and single rooms were required to be a minimum of 100 square feet.  Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 380–82 (M.D. Ala. 1972).  The court appointed a human
rights committee to monitor compliance with these instructions, and when the state insti-
tutions failed to meet all of the items to the letter, they were placed in receivership, with a
court-appointed manager taking over the running of the institutions. See TINSLEY E. YAR-
BROUGH, JUDGE FRANK JOHNSON AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ALABAMA (Univ. of Alabama Press
1981).
Similarly, in the late 1970s in Jose P. v. Ambach, a federal district court in New York
held that New York City’s public education system was in persistent violation of the educa-
tional rights of pupils with special needs. Jose P. v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1982).
While the City acknowledged that its public school system left a great deal to de desired
with respect to special education, the court held that the ‘polycentric’ nature of the prob-
lem and the process needed to resolve it was not suited to the ‘courtroom-bound adjudi-
cative process,’ and appointed a special master to mediate negotiations between the
parties.  The 515-page consent decree eventually agreed on by the parties made an order
of court regulate just about every aspect of special education and included specific direc-
tives with respect to most of these aspects. See also SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 20,
at 63.
34. Centre for Child Law v. Government of the Eastern Cape Province, unreported,
ECHCB case no. 504/10 (S. Afr.).
35. Id. at para. 10.
36. In South Africa, see Residents of Joe Slovo Cmty., Western Cape v. Thubelisha Homes
2010 (3) SA 454 (CC) (S. Afr.) (setting out both the building specifications for temporary
housing to accommodate people displaced from informal housing and the timetable
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Colombia, the Constitutional Court’s structural injunctions are often
based on a finding that a ‘state of unconstitutional affairs’ exists, in
which the ongoing violation of rights is a direct result of the normal
operation of the regulatory system rather than aberrant departures
from it.38  Structural injunctions are meant to alleviate the state of
unconstitutional affairs.
2. The Danger of Regulatory Formalism
Opinion on the value of structural injunctions is divided, with judi-
cial and academic support both for and against.39  Examples of both
successful and unsuccessful institutional reform litigation are readily
available.40  Ultimately, a claim that judicial intervention or non-inter-
vention has produced the best results in a particular case is non-falsifi-
able, since the circumstances of each case are different and there is no
according to which displaced persons must be relocated to permanent housing). In
Colombia, see Sentencia T-025/04, supra note 11 (mandating the adoption of public pol- R
icy on displaced persons where none had existed before and supervised the allocation of
budgetary resources to the fulfillment of the policy).
37. In Colombia, see Sentencia T-760/08, supra note 24 (seeking changes to the
national health care system by ordering the expansion of benefits under a subsidized
health care scheme to meet the level of benefits under a contributory scheme, altering
the system of reimbursements to health care providers for treatments not covered by the
health providers located outside the scheme, and expanding access to the system).
38. David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional
Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 319, 358 (2010).
39. For judicial criticism of institutional reform litigation and structural injunc-
tions, see the U.S. Supreme Court judgments in Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004) and
Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009).  For judicial approval, on the other hand, see Brown v.
Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
For academic criticisms, see Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978); Sandler & Schoenbrod, The Supreme Court, supra note 22; San- R
dler & Schoenbrod, From Status to Contract and Back Again, supra note 22; SANDLER & R
SCHOENBROD, supra note 20; Koerner, supra note 22; William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary R
Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635 (1982); ROSEN-
BERG, supra note 23. R
For academic celebration of structural injunctions, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme
Court, 1978 Term – Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); and FEELEY &
RUBIN, supra note 22. R
40. Robert Kagan points out that assessing the impact of social litigation is always
difficult (ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 4
(Harvard Univ. Press 2001)):
There is no way to count up and compare all the social costs and social
benefits that a gigantic, multifaceted legal system sends rippling through eco-
nomic, political, and communal life. And even if one could make such a calcula-
tion, the question would remain, “[c]ompared to what?” That is, would
alternative ways of implementing public policy and resolving disputes yield
higher aggregate benefits and lower social costs, or vice versa?
A notable example of an unsuccessful structural injunction is the Indian Supreme
Court’s immersion in Bombay’s water shortages in 2009.  The Court ordered the division
of water from the Krishna River and its tributaries among the states of Maharashtra, And-
hra Pradesh and Karnataka according to a specific ratio, but compliance with the order
left 17 million Bombay residents without water for up to two days every week. Chris Lo,
Maintaining Maharashtra: The High-Tech Response to Water Crisis, WATER-TECHNOLOGY (Jan.
31, 2011), http://www.water-technology.net/features/feature108551.
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counterfactual to which the results in those circumstances can be
compared.41
My objective is not to argue that structural injunctions do not work,
or that they should never be issued by courts.  My concern is rather that
structural injunctions hold officials to increasingly specific standards
and rules, with little emphasis on the need for official conduct to con-
sider the substantive objectives and commitments expressed as eco-
nomic and social rights.  Formal compliance with highly specific court
orders may shift officials’ focus away from the constitutional norms that
underlie social legislation, and which social legislation is, ideally,
intended to promote.  Official discretion and regulatory flexibility allow
officials to respond to changing socio-economic needs and social or
environmental circumstances in order to ensure that their conduct
remains congruent with these constitutional norms.  But as courts and
rights-claiming individuals heap multiplying demands on officials and
the constraints under which the officials must operate grow, this discre-
tion and flexibility are stripped away.42  The resultant increase in regu-
latory formalism, as courts hold officials to increasingly strict structural
orders, may draw officials’ attention away from the constitutional
imperatives of social legislation.  Regulatory formalism thus severs the
connection between constitutional norms and statutory rules for official
conduct, leaving official conduct untethered from the constitutional
norms to which the entire regulatory framework is tied.
A second reason to be wary of IRL is the extent to which it makes
courts indispensable to the regulatory process.  Courts fulfill an increas-
ingly bureaucratic rather than a purely adjudicative function as they
maintain jurisdiction and supervise compliance with more, and more
detailed, structural injunctions.43  The drain on judicial resources is
large, and since courts are far smaller institutions than the administra-
tive agencies and bureaucracies established specifically to administer
programs of social provision, it is unreasonable to expect courts to
effectively police more than a few structural injunctions at a time.44
The strong enforcement of rights encourages judicial enforcement, as
opposed to administrative supervision, of regulatory rules and policy.45
The outcome is not merely that courts may be called on to vindicate
and protect rights where patterns of official conduct threaten them, as
41. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 22, at 26; SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 20, at R
6, 93–94.
42. R. Shep Melnick, Risky Business, in TAKING STOCK: AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 158 (Morton Keller & R. Shep Melnick eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1999); see also chapters 2 and 3 above, for more on how practices of adaptive man-
agement and integrated water resource management fit with the ideas of normative con-
gruence and regulatory harmony.
43. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 16
(Harvard Univ. Press 2001) (arguing that it is only “a slight oversimplification” to say that
“lawyers, legal rights, judges, and lawsuits are the functional equivalent of the large cen-
tral bureaucracies that dominate governance in high-tax, activist welfare states”).
44. Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, supra note 3, at 225. R
45. Edward Rubin, The Conceptual Explanation for Legislative Failure, 30 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 583, 595 (2005).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\31-1\NDE103.txt unknown Seq: 12 12-JUL-17 14:53
96 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 31
we would expect from courts in any constitutional democracy, but that
litigation and court decisions become indispensable to the process of
regulation as courts become ‘enmeshed’ in regulation.46
Concerns about regulatory formalism and bureaucratic enmesh-
ment can be met by closer attention to the connections between the
statutory rules for official behavior and the constitutional commitments
that underlie those regulatory frameworks.  As long as officials’ actions
and decisions are motivated by and directed toward the achievement of
the vision of socio-economic provision expressed in legislation, specific
injunctions can avoid the pitfalls of regulatory formalism.  The specter
of regulatory formalism does not require rejecting structural injunc-
tions altogether, but rather requires courts to determine, first of all,
whether the conduct of officials responsible for implementing social
legislation is oriented toward and congruent with the constitutional
norms the legislation is meant to achieve.  Second, whatever structural
injunctions order officials to do, they should make clear that the ulti-
mate objective of the structural reform is congruence with the constitu-
tional commitments that prompted social legislation and regulatory
intervention in the first place.
David Landau’s support for structural injunctions as a promising
mechanism of economic and social rights enforcement is qualified in a
similar way.  He concludes from a comparison of two prominent
Colombian Constitutional Court cases (the Displaced Persons case and
the Health Care case)47 that structural injunctions will be effective only
under certain political conditions.48  Landau does not go into any more
detail in describing these conditions than to say that the Court’s choices
yielded positive results where the Court, civil society, and the bureau-
cracy shared “an essentially similar vision” of how to go about remedy-
ing structural problems.49  Ultimately, if structural injunctions are
superimposed on situations in which officials fail to recognize how the
regulatory rules governing their conduct are connected to deeper con-
stitutional commitments, attempts to uphold rules against officials are
unlikely to result in the fulfillment of those constitutional commit-
ments.  But if courts can emphasize how these constitutional values pro-
vide the normative foundations for social legislation and regulatory
rules, and ensure that officials share that constitutional vision and
understand how it shapes their conduct in terms of statutory rules, the
imposition of even highly detailed structural injunctions can guide offi-
cial conduct toward the realization of core commitments to economic
and social rights rather than promote merely formal compliance with
numerous individual injunctions.  Even better, where officials them-
selves remain focused on these core commitments, the need for courts
to remain enmeshed in processes of regulation or institutional reform
will be reduced.
46. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
47. See supra text accompanying notes 36–37. R
48. Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, supra note 3, at 225. R
49. Id. at 227.
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B. The Minimum Core Approach
The minimum core approach holds that economic and social
rights impose obligations on the state to ensure access to a determinate
minimum bundle of socio-economic resources.  The approach has its
roots in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, which provides that state parties have an obligation to take
steps–– subject to the availability of resources––to achieve the progres-
sive realization of each right in the Covenant.  The UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explained in its General Com-
ment no. 3 in 1990 that state parties to the Covenant have an obligation
to provide the minimum core content of each right, despite the pro-
gressive nature of the obligations and the subordination of the obliga-
tion to the availability of resources.50
Defining the minimum core content of each economic and social
right requires states to think about how to allocate scarce resources so
as to ensure that the minimum core of each right is met.  The state
must continue to progressively realize each right even after this mini-
mum is assured but may only rely on scarce resources to escape obliga-
tions once the floor is met.  The minimum core also provides an
objective and determinate standard against which the state’s conduct
can be evaluated.  Failure to provide the minimum core is an unambig-
uous violation of the right, and we might expect a court finding such a
violation to order the state to provide access to the minimum level of
socio-economic resources.  A court might conceivably choose to issue a
structural injunction in addition, specifying the action to be taken by
the state in order to meet the minimum obligation.  The minimum
core approach takes a strong view of rights, and while it takes no partic-
ular view on remedies, it is easily capable of being followed with a
strong remedy.
1. Judicial Rejection of the Minimum Core Approach
Without a statutory definition of the minimum core of economic
and social rights, courts have been reluctant to employ the approach.
This reluctance is consistent with my own desire to pay attention to the
role of legislation in rights protection.  Proponents of the minimum
core approach, consequently, tend to ignore the relevance of the legis-
lature’s role in defining the minimum core of economic and social
rights, arguing instead that courts should take on both the primary role
in defining the minimum core and the secondary role in holding the
administrative branches to it.
The South African Constitution provides something of a best-case
test for the minimum core approach because the economic and social
rights in the South African Constitution are framed in very similar
terms to those in the Covenant.51  The South African Constitutional
50. The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural
Rts., Gen. Comment 3 on Its Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990), http://
www.refworld.org/docid/4538838e10.html.
51. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ss. 27 provides:
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\31-1\NDE103.txt unknown Seq: 14 12-JUL-17 14:53
98 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 31
Court has been asked on a number of occasions to consider defining a
minimum core content for the economic and social rights in the Con-
stitution and has each time refused.52  Holding the state to rigid rules
of socio-economic provision, the Court has said, does not take into
account inter-individual variation, variations between different commu-
nities, or the competing demands on a state’s resources over time,
which may affect the level at which access to socio-economic resources
needs to be provided.  It is conceptually difficult for a court to define a
minimum core that remains relevant and appropriate for all sectors of
society and over time, especially without adequate information about
people’s socio-economic needs and evidence supporting a specific mini-
mum core.53  Moreover, the obligation to provide quantified bundles of
socio-economic resources for all people in all circumstances may
reduce state officials’ ability to adapt to changing circumstances and
changing needs.  Defining core content to economic and social rights
prevents sensitivity to the context in which real people utilize socio-eco-
nomic resources.54
The foil to the South African Constitutional Court’s rejection of
the minimum core approach appears to be the Colombian Constitu-
tional Court’s embrace of a ‘vital minimum’ as the basis of enforcing
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to—
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;
(b) sufficient food and water; and
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves
and their dependents, appropriate social assistance.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within
its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these
rights.
The section 26 right to housing is framed according to the same schema, with the
right in subsection (1) qualified by the terms of subsection (2).
52.  Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) [hereinaf-
ter Grootboom]; Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) 2002 (5) SA
721 (CC) at para. 38 [hereinafter Treatment Action Campaign]; Mazibuko, supra note 10, at R
30.
53. In Grootboom, supra note 52, at 26–28, the South African Constitutional Court
held:
It is not possible to determine the minimum threshold for the progressive real-
isation of the right of access to adequate housing without first identifying the
needs and opportunities for the enjoyment of such a right. These will vary
according to factors such as income, unemployment, availability of land and pov-
erty. . . . In this case, we do not have sufficient information to determine what
would comprise the minimum core obligation in the context of our
Constitution.
54. See Mazibuko, supra note 10, at 30; “[W]hat the right requires will vary over time R
and context.  Fixing a quantified content might, in a rigid and counter-productive man-
ner, prevent an analysis of context.”  Brian Ray has described the Court’s preference for
engagement with officials and regulators over the minimum core approach as the
‘proceduralisation’ of economic and social rights.  Although the Court has been criticized
for this preference, unsurprisingly by proponents of the minimum core approach, Ray
argues that proceduralisation promises to strengthen and promote consistent attention to
the values that constitutional rights protect. See BRIAN RAY, ENGAGING WITH SOCIAL
RIGHTS: PROCEDURE, PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA’S SECOND WAVE
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2016); Brian Ray, Proceduralisation’s Triumph and Engagement’s
Promise in Socio-Economic Rights Litigation, 27 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 107 (2011).
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economic and social rights.  Where a person’s lack of access to socio-
economic resources like health care or social assistance threatens that
person’s life, dignity, or physical integrity, and the person has no other
means of obtaining access to necessary resources, the Court has inter-
preted the Colombian Constitution’s economic and social rights to
require the state to provide access to a minimal level of food, clothing,
and housing.55  Conversely, where a person fails to convince a court
that he or she has neither access to socio-economic resources nor
means of obtaining access without state assistance, the right is not
infringed and no state obligation to provide access arises.56  In none of
the cases dealing with the vital minimum principle, however, has the
Colombian Court defined the extent or level of the vital minimum.
The Court has said that economic and social rights will have been
infringed if a lack of access to socio-economic resources threatens life,
dignity, or physical integrity, but the Court must nevertheless deter-
mine on the facts of every case if the state’s conduct threatens life, dig-
nity, or physical integrity.
The South African and Colombian Constitutional Courts’ wariness
of minimum core arguments fit with the concerns I raise above in Sec-
tion A about regulatory formalism.  Enforcing a minimum core against
the state may reduce the state’s constitutional obligations to checking
off a list of goods to be provided, while any attention on the benefits or
value that access to these goods provides for people is lost. We do not
value economic and social rights simply for the goods they deliver, but
for the things that access to those goods allow us to be and do.  The
‘capabilities’ approach to distributive justice enjoins recognizing that
because individuals are different from one another, some will need
more or less of a certain resource than others to live a life of dignity.57
The ‘survivalist’ approach, by contrast, focuses state action on mechani-
cal compliance with formal quantifications of rights and imposes no
obligation on the state to consider inter-individual variations or the
benefits socio-economic resources actually deliver for real people.58
55. The origin of the vital minimum principle in Colombia is a case involving the
payment of pension benefits: Sentencia No. T-426/92 (Jun. 24, 1992) (Colom.), http://
www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1992/t-426-92.htm.
56. With respect to pensions, see Sentencia No. T-516/93 (Nov. 10, 1993)
(Colom.), http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1993/T-516-93.htm;
Sentencia No. T-193/97 (Apr. 15, 1997) (Colom.), http://www.corteconstitucional.gov
.co/relatoria/1997/T-193-97.htm. With respect to health care, see Sentencia T-527/93
(Nov. 10, 1993) (Colom.), http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1993/T-527-
93.htm.
57. Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have developed the capabilities approach:
see AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 74 (Anchor Books 1999); MARTHA C. NUSS-
BAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (Belknap Press
2006); see also Katharine G. Young, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Con-
cept in Search of Content, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 126–38 (2008).
58. Sen notes that defining an essential minimum is difficult even before inter-indi-
vidual variation is considered.  People can survive—merely survive—with incredibly little
food.  The quality of life improves cumulatively as the quality of diet improves.  Defining
the ‘minimum nutritional requirement’ is thus arbitrary: either the minimum is at the
incredibly low level that allows mere survival, which seems to strip the right of all mean-
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Proponents of the minimum core approach may yet argue it is consis-
tent with a capabilities understanding of rights, because even if our
objective is to ensure a life with dignity rather than a life with access to
quantified amounts of socio-economic goods, we need some idea of
what a life with minimum dignity looks like.  This may be so, but defin-
ing a dignitarian minimum proves difficult in practice.  Even the two
dominant proponents of the capabilities approach disagree about
whether a core ‘list’ of human capabilities can or should be
described.59
2. The Room for Legislative Involvement
It turns out to be very difficult to argue that economic and social
rights carry an inherent minimum core content precisely because the
core content of rights remains contested.60  It is even more difficult to
argue that courts should be the institutions responsible for defining this
core.  The existence of legitimate and reasonable disagreement
between people on the essential content of economic and social rights
suggests that fixing this content—whether as a bundle of resources or
as a list of capabilities that access to resources should enable—is a mat-
ter for public debate and deliberation to be carried on in the public
forums representative of all of a nation’s people.
A specific minimum core may yet resist consensus, but if it is to be
set in a specific national and social context, it must at least take into
account the disagreements between people about what a right’s mini-
mum core content should be.61  Where economic and social rights are
to be given a minimum core, the courts should not be the only, or even
the main, institution responsible for doing so.  The legislature is better
suited to resolving, or at least airing, disagreement and gathering the
ingful value, or it is at some level above this absolute minimum.  Drawing a line at this
latter level, however, has “an inherent arbitrariness that goes well beyond variations
between groups and regions.” AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLE-
MENT AND DEPRIVATION 12 (Oxford Univ. Press 1982).
It is extremely interesting to note that in 1979 Philip Alston, eventually the author of
the UN’s minimum core doctrine in General Comment No. 3, argued that a hierarchy of
development goals informed by a commitment to fulfilling basic needs for bundles of
material resources was not consistent with the normative goals of human rights. Philip
Alston, Human Rights and Basic Needs: A Critical Assessment, 12 HUM. RTS. J. 19, 55–56
(1979).
59. Compare MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPA-
BILITIES APPROACH 74 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2000), and NUSSBAUM, supra note 57, at 79,
with Amartya Sen, Dialogue: Capabilities, Lists and Public Reason: Continuing the Conversation,
10 FEMINIST ECON. 77, 78 (2004).
60. Young, supra note 57, at 138. R
61. Jeremy Waldron makes a similar argument about rights in general, arguing that
the interpretation of all constitutional rights should be a matter for public debate rather
than the exclusive preserve of the courts. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT
(Oxford Univ. Press 1999); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115
YALE L. J. 1346 (2005–2006); Jeremy Waldron, Can There Be a Democratic Jurisprudence?
08–35 N.Y.U. PUB. L. & LEGAL RES. PAPER SERIES (2008), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1280923. For my own response to Waldron’s argument, see Richard Stacey, Demo-
cratic Jurisprudence and Judicial Review: Waldron’s Contribution to Political Positivism, 30
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 749 (2010).
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information on the basis of which a minimum core could begin to crys-
tallize.62  The Colombian judge responsible for crafting the vital mini-
mum principle in the first place has subsequently held that the courts
should enforce a vital minimum against the state only where a person is
seeking to gain access to services or resources that are already provided
for in law.63  For its part, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights has never suggested that courts should define the mini-
mum core of each right.
Nevertheless, the debate about the minimum core has focused
almost exclusively on the judicial role in defining the minimum core
for economic and social rights.64  These debates pay scant attention to
the role of the legislature in articulating and defining economic and
social rights, and for this reason present a somewhat impoverished
account of rights enforcement.  The entire political system—policymak-
ers, legislatures, administrative officials, and courts—is responsible for
developing the framework for the fulfillment of economic and social
rights.  This is not the mandate of the judiciary alone.  Moreover, where
social legislation does set a minimum core content to rights and sets
clear targets for administrative officials, the need to pay attention to the
constitutional foundations of the legislation does not disappear.  The
statutory specification of a minimum core should not remove our focus
from the fundamental reasons we value rights in the first place, and
neither does it remove any role for the courts.  On the contrary, the
courts’ role in the context of a statutorily specified minimum core—or
indeed any other statutory elaboration of a constitutional right—is to
assess whether statutory rules are congruent with constitutional norms.
The ‘administrative law’ model of rights enforcement provides one
account of how this might be done.
C. The Administrative Law Model of Rights Enforcement
1. Moving Beyond the Minimum Core
The administrative law model is an alternative to the minimum
core doctrine.65  It takes a weaker view of economic and social rights in
that courts are not made responsible for defining the content of rights.
On the administrative law model, courts assess only whether officials’
efforts to realize rights are reasonable in the circumstances.  The
enforcement of rights is similarly ‘weak’ on this approach, since there is
a range of reasonable options a state could adopt in attempting to real-
ize economic and social rights.  Were a court to find that a state’s policy
or program of rights fulfillment was unreasonable it would do no more,
62. Treatment Action Campaign, supra note 52, at 28–29. R
63. Sentencia No. SU-111/97 (Aug. 9, 1996) (Colom.), http://www.corteconstitu
cional.gov.co/relatoria/1997/su111-97.htm.
64. See, e.g., Karin Lehmann, In Defense of the Constitutional Court: Litigating Socio-
Economic Rights and the Myth of the Minimum Core, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 163, 182 (2006);
BILCHITZ, supra note 5; Bilchitz, Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core, supra R
note 5; Bilchitz, Giving Socio-Economic Rights Teeth, supra note 5. R
65. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 221–38. R
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on this approach, than point out the unreasonableness and direct the
state to address the defects in its program.66
The logic of reasonableness is pervasive.  Even the Colombian Con-
stitutional Court, with the principle of the vital minimum as the basis of
economic and social rights enforcement, relies on reasonableness to
adjudicate claims.  In none of the Colombian cases has the Constitu-
tional Court specified a vital minimum; rather, it has inquired into the
reasonableness of a litigant’s claim that the lack of access to socio-eco-
nomic goods threatens life, dignity, or physical integrity.  The vital mini-
mum is translated into political action only after analysis of
reasonableness in the circumstances, and not by a straightforward
assessment of whether a quantified minimum has been provided or not.
While the U.S. Constitution is usually taken not to contain positive
rights to socio-economic resources,67 state constitutions often enshrine
rights of this kind.  The New York State Constitution provides that the
“aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be
provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such man-
ner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time deter-
mine.”68  In McCain v. Koch, a New York case dealing with emergency
housing for homeless families with children, the court held that once
an obligation to provide emergency shelter had been made by the state,
the shelter had to meet ‘reasonable minimum standards.’69  This ‘wel-
fare clause’ was relied on to assert a right of families with children to
emergency shelter, in circumstances where the state already bore an
obligation to needy families under the federal Aid to Families with
Dependent Children Act.  The trial court held that while the constitu-
tional welfare clause did not require in explicit terms that shelter must
be provided for needy families, once the obligation to provide shelter
had been assumed by the state in statute it was required to ensure that
shelter met ‘reasonable minimum standards’.70  The language here
suggests a minimum core approach, but note that the court’s conclu-
66. The notion of ‘legitimate diversity’ is used in the international human rights
field to describe the range of options that are open to states in meeting their human
rights obligations under international law.  Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, Inter-
national Economic Law and ‘Constitutional Justice,’ 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 769 (2008); Mathias
Kumm, Political Liberalism and the Structures of Rights: On the Place and Limits of the Proportion-
ality Requirement, in LAW, RIGHTS AND DISCOURSE: THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT ALEXY
131 (GEORGE PAVLAKOS ED., Hart Publishing 2007).  It has been borrowed, in South
Africa, to describe the approach to judicial scrutiny of administrative actions intended to
protect and fulfill rights. See Richard Stacey, Democratising Review: Justifiability as the Ani-
mating Vision of Administrative Law, 22 S. AFR. PUB. L. 79 (2007); Cora Hoexter, The Future
of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law, 117 S. AFR. L. J. 484 (2000). See also
the South African Constitutional Court decision in Bato Star (Pty) Ltd v. Minister of Envtl
Aff., 23–25, 29–33 (2004) (S. Afr.). In the USA, courts have been loath to review social
legislation for anything more than rationality, accepting that the federal Constitution
does not impose any specific courses of action on the legislature. See Kathleen M. Sullivan,
The Supreme Court 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22, 60 (1992).
67. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
68. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
69. McCain v. Koch, 484 N.Y.S. 2d 985, 987 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
70. Id.
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sion flows from the state’s legislative assumption of the obligation to
provide a basic minimum rather than from the inherent nature of the
right.  Moreover, the judgment turns on what is reasonable in the cir-
cumstances, rather than on some universal and inflexible minimum
core.
The South African Constitution explicitly sets reasonableness as
the standard of scrutiny for the state’s rights-fulfilling conduct.  Each of
the rights to housing, health care, social assistance, food, and water set
out in sections 26(1) and 27(1) must be read in the context of the
state’s obligation in sections 26(2) and 27(2) to take reasonable steps,
subject to available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of
each right.  The South African Constitutional Court has stated that
determining the content of each of the rights—that is, working out
what each right entitles citizens to—must proceed on the basis of a
determination of what it would be reasonable for the state to provide,
within its available resources, in order to realize the right progressively.
In Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, the Court held
that “section 27(1) of the Constitution does not give rise to a self-stand-
ing and independent positive right enforceable irrespective of the con-
siderations mentioned in section 27(2).”71  Similarly in Khosa v. Minister
of Social Development, the Court held that “the ambit of the [section]
27(1) right can . . . not be determined without reference to the reasona-
bleness of the measures adopted to fulfill the obligation toward those
entitled to the right in [section] 27(1).”72  The right to water, as the
Court stated in Mazibuko, “does not require the state upon demand to
provide every person with sufficient water” but requires the state take
reasonable steps toward meeting water needs.73
The judicial assessment of reasonableness involves neither an artic-
ulation of the content of the right in question, nor the imposition of a
structural order setting out in precise terms how officials should act.  In
this way, the administrative law model avoids the pitfalls of regulatory
formalism and judicial enmeshment.  The extent of the court’s involve-
ment is to point out where official conduct is unreasonable.  Moreover,
the administrative law model is likely to lead to the same outcome as
the minimum core approach in many cases: a failure to provide socio-
economic resources below the minimum level at which human life is
possible or at which dignified human functioning becomes possible is
probably unreasonable.  If this is the case, though, there is no need to
define the minimum core beforehand.  All the hard work can be done
by the criterion of reasonableness.
2. The Flaw in the Administrative Law Model
The judicial application of the administrative law model reorients
the official pursuit of economic and social rights towards reasonable-
ness.  Unreasonable conduct violates rights, while reasonable conduct
71. Treatment Action Campaign, supra note 52, at 29. R
72. Khosa v. Minister of Soc. Dev., (2004) 6 SA 505 (S. Afr.) at para. 43.
73. Mazibuko, supra note 10, at 25. R
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upholds rights.  All the courts are required to do is make an assessment
of reasonableness, steering a middle course between holding rights
non-justiciable and creating an immediately enforceable and absolute
duty to provide socio-economic goods.74  The drawback, as critics of the
administrative law model have pointed out, is that the criterion of rea-
sonableness is an amorphous and empty one that ultimately provides
no guidance to state officials without the intervention of the courts.75
Reasonableness on its own carries no evaluative standard that can be
parlayed into a workable model of implementing rights.  As it stands,
the model allows only courts to make a finding on the reasonableness
of state policy.  The criterion of reasonableness and judicial determina-
tions of unreasonableness do not identify an accessible, substantive
standard by which officials involved in efforts to realize economic and
social rights can by themselves, without the intervention of courts,
ensure that their conduct is reasonable.  It seems that courts must be
involved in the administration of the administrative law model of rights
enforcement because they have the final word—perhaps the only
word—on what is reasonable.
This flaw in the administrative law model can be remedied if insti-
tutions other than the courts are empowered to determine the reasona-
bleness of rights-fulfilling conduct.  This requires filling in the criterion
of reasonableness with evaluative content that is available to and accessi-
ble by officials in the regulatory system, and not within the exclusive
knowledge of the courts.  The ideal vehicle for communicating this
evaluative content is the social legislation enacted to promote the eco-
nomic and social rights in question.  Social legislation not only sets out
the formal rules and processes with which official conduct must be con-
gruent, but also embodies the substantive objectives that the protection
and fulfillment of economic and social rights are meant to achieve.  In
this way, reasonableness is filled in with evaluative criteria.
By reorienting official conduct to the substantive objectives of
social legislation rather than an amorphous criterion of reasonableness
in the exclusive province of the courts, official conduct may be brought
more into line with the constitutional norms on which the legislation
rests.  Official conduct should, in other words, be consistent not only
with the formal rules that constrain official behavior, but also with the
substantive objectives against which official conduct is to be evaluated.
A focus on reasonableness alone does not provide a solution to the
problem of persistent and recurring non-compliance with social legisla-
tion, because it provides no standards of evaluation.  If reasonableness
is to work in holding officials to economic and social rights obligations,
74. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 233. R
75. Bilchitz, Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core, supra note 5, at 10. R
See also Langford & Stacey, Water, supra note 15, at 34–37; Kevin Iles, Limiting Socio-Eco-
nomic Rights: Beyond the Internal Limitations Clauses, 20 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 448, 457 (2004);
Carol Steinberg, Can Reasonableness Protect the Poor? A Review of South Africa’s Socio-Economic
Rights Jurisprudence, 123 S. AFR. L. J. 264 (2006); Nick de Villiers, Procedural Fairness and
Reasonable Administrative Action within the Social Assistance System: Implications of Some Settled
Class Actions, 22 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 405 (2006); BILCHITZ, supra note 5. R
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courts must pay attention to the evaluative standards contained in legis-
lation intended to advance economic and social rights.
D. The Catalytic Court
The minimum core approach and structural injunctions both take
a view of economic and social rights as strong, while the administrative
law model takes a weaker view.  Remedies for rights violations can them-
selves be weak or strong.  Katharine Young suggests a typology of five
judicial responses along these continuums, arguing that a “catalytic”
court can “lower the political energy” needed to reorient government
action toward the protection of rights by drawing on each of the models
in the typology as circumstances require.76  The objective of the cata-
lytic court is to decenter the courts in the project of economic and
social rights fulfillment and locate the court as a partner, with the other
branches of government, in that project.  This is a promising approach
to the extent that it offers an alternative to approaches that see courts
as the primary drivers of rights fulfillment.
The weakest type of review Young describes is “deferential” review,
in which courts defer to the democratic authority of the elected
branches and are slow to find public authorities in violation of obliga-
tions to fulfill economic and social rights.  Deference to the elected
branches may nevertheless concentrate political energy on the failures
or shortcomings of a government’s economic and social rights pro-
grams even without finding a violation of rights.77
“Conversational” review sees courts engaging slightly more,
although without ordering government to act in particular ways.  The
conversational approach to rights enforcement has been alternately
described as the “new Commonwealth” model, acknowledging the fact
that in some Commonwealth jurisdictions—the UK and New Zealand
primarily—courts have no power to overturn legislation on the grounds
of unconstitutionality.78  The “notwithstanding” clause in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms places Canadian courts in the category
of conversational review by fostering “dialogue” between the court and
the legislature.79  The idea is that the “correct” interpretation of rights
and how to enforce them emerges from the contested space in which
all branches of the political system contribute their own ideas.80
“Experimental” review builds on this conversation.  Courts and
administrators maintain vigorous and close scrutiny of the effects of
policy and legislation, attempting to identify and find solutions to fail-
76. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 172–74. R
77. Id. at 147.
78. Gardbaum, supra note 18. R
79. Rosalind Dixon, The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter Dialogue and Deference, 47
OSGOODE HALL L. J. 235 (2009); Rosalind Dixon, Creating Dialogue about Socioeconomic
Rights: Strong-Form versus Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 391
(2007).
80. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 147. R
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ures of rights-implementing programs as they arise.81  Experimentalist
courts do not make “strong” orders that prescribe the steps officials
must take, but in bringing parties to a dispute together and requiring
some form of meaningful engagement between them, hope to nudge
government toward adopting new approaches to the realization of
rights.
The stronger types of review on Young’s typology are “managerial”
review, which captures the imposition of structural interdicts in
response to institutional reform litigation, and “peremptory” review, in
which courts assert their superiority over other branches by striking
down legislation or government policy as unconstitutional or interpret-
ing it in ways that make it constitutional.82
The catalytic court chooses a response from within this typology of
review in each case.  Young suggests that this choice is influenced most
immediately in each case by “the particular obstructive stance taken by
the government, that underlies the complaint of an economic and
social rights infringement.”83  This approach is a significant advance
over the approaches to judicial review that argue for the application of
either one or the other of the approaches described above.  Young’s
approach allows courts to be flexible in their responses to administra-
tive recalcitrance, adapting to the circumstances as necessary rather
than bound to a particular type of review or order.  What the catalytic
court model lacks, however, is an indication of the standards of scrutiny
against which threats to or infringements of economic and social rights
will be assessed, whichever form of review is followed.  Young’s model
does not offer a substantive decision rule courts can follow in deciding
what constitutional economic and social rights oblige a government to
do in each case.  As a result, the catalytic courts model offers an account
of the form of judicial review, but not an account of its substantive lim-
its.  Courts are directed as to what form of review to follow—deferen-
tial, conversational, experimental, managerial, or peremptory—based
on the circumstances of government recalcitrance, but are left with the
same impoverished and norm-insensitive models of rights enforcement
that each of these existing models brings.
This gap can be filled by a clear focus on the constitutional norms,
expressed as economic and social rights, which social legislation
encodes in rules for official conduct.  Whichever type of review a cata-
lytic court chooses, it should exercise that type of review mindful of the
need to maintain the connection between constitutional commitments
and efforts to meet them, both in the text of social legislation and in
81. Id. at 150. See also Sabel & Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Adminis-
trative State, supra note 19; Sabel & Simon, Destabilization Rights, supra note 19. R
82. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 193–94. R
83. Id. at 177, 189.  Young considers four explanations for the choice of review type
before suggesting that courts are most influenced by the attitude of the government itself.
See also Kent Roach & Geoff Budlender, Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When
is it Appropriate, Just and Equitable? 122 S. AFR. L.J. 325 (2005); Chris Hansen, Making it
Work: Implementation of Court Orders Requiring Restructuring of State Executive Branch Agencies,
in CHILD, PARENT AND STATE 224 (S. Randall Humm ed., 1994).
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official implementation of social legislation.  This requires the recogni-
tion of the role that social legislation plays in communicating constitu-
tional commitments to officials.  The objective of courts under any of
these types of review should be to ensure that officials understand and
appreciate the normative objectives encoded in statutory and regulatory
frameworks for economic and social rights fulfillment, and to ensure
that official conduct is congruent with those normative objectives.  A
catalytic court that is focused on normativity decenters the judiciary in
the way that Young favors.  By orienting officials toward an understand-
ing of the constitutional foundations of social legislation, officials come
to appreciate the substantive objectives of the legislation that governs
their behavior and should reduce, in turn, the need for courts to
actively manage the bureaucratic and regulatory processes by which
social legislation is implemented.
Young’s catalytic court approach envisages a dynamic court, flexi-
ble and responsive to changing political and institutional circum-
stances.  The approach does not address the lack of attention to
constitutional normativity that already plagues the existing models of
rights enforcement, however.  Adding an element of normativity to
Young’s dynamic court approach, in the form of attention to the way
the social legislation both communicates constitutional commitments
to officials and sets rules for their conduct in enforcing constitutional
rights, introduces a “regulatory constitutional” character to this
dynamic approach.  This model depends, however, on a theoretical
unpacking of legislation’s function as a mechanism for communicating
constitutional norms to officials.  The idea of normative congruence
provides this theoretical substance and offers a new perspective from
which to assess the constitutional acceptability of a state’s efforts to
achieve economic and social rights.
II. DYNAMIC REGULATORY CONSTITUTIONALISM
A. The Idea of Normative Congruence and the Role of Social Legislation
The principle of congruence is a core feature of the rule of law.  It
requires that the exercise of public powers and the performance of
public functions by government officials be congruent with rules set out
beforehand.  More specifically, a commitment to the rule of law
requires that the law must set and enforce limits to a society’s institu-
tions of power and impose substantive legal limits on government
which serve to both constrain and guide the behavior of state officials.84
Without such rules and without adherence to them, society will be
ruled according to the whims of the men and women in power and not
according to law.  The principle of congruence implies and presup-
poses a body of positive legislation that sets limits to and describes the
modalities of government power.
84. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Tension Between Legal Instrumentalism and the Rule of Law,
33 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 131 (2005).  Carol Harlow, too, describes the rule of law as
requiring ‘bounded’ government: Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for
Principles and Values, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187, 207 (2006).
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I use the principle of congruence and the attention to positive law
that it implies in offering a theoretical account of the gap in the
existing models of economic and social rights enforcement.  This new
theoretical perspective on the place and function of social legislation
lies at the heart of dynamic regulatory constitutionalism.  I start with
Lon Fuller’s canonical account of the principle of congruence.
1. The Normative Extension of the Principle of Congruence
Accounts of the rule of law usually offer one or other “laundry list”
of principles of legality.85  The majority of the principles describe the
characteristics that laws themselves must have if they are to be effective,
as a technology of governance, in creating order in society.  The first
seven of Fuller’s principles are of this nature.  But Fuller goes on to say
that the eighth principle, which he calls the principle of congruence, is
“the basic principle of the Rule of Law.”86  The principle of congruence
does not describe a characteristic that laws must have but rather
demands that whatever the law says, official conduct must be congruent
with it.  The question of official congruence with previously declared
rules can only arise once rules have been declared.  In this sense the
rule of law relies heavily on positive legislation that set the rules for
official conduct. Legislation has a central place in Fuller’s conception
of the rule of law.87
Further, the principle of congruence is the basic principle of the
rule of law because if officials do not comply with rules, it will not mat-
ter that the rules meet the requirements of the other seven principles of
legality.  However, faithful to the first seven principles of legality, these
positive laws are the effectiveness of law as a technology of government
will be undermined if officials act incongruently with those laws.
In requiring only that officials comply with previously declared
rules, whatever they are, the principles of congruence and the rule of
law generally carry no specific substantive content.88  The rule of law as
such does not commit a government to the protection of economic and
social rights, for example, or to the protection of private property, lib-
erty, or market capitalism.89  Fuller and others argue that the rule of
85. Laundry lists are presented by, for example, A.V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 188–95 (MacMillan 8th ed. 1915) (1885);
FULLER, supra note 9, at 33-38; Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY
OF LAW 211 (Oxford Univ. Press 1979); Lawrence Solum, Equity and the Rule of Law, in THE
RULE OF LAW – NOMOS XXXVI 120 (Ian Shapiro ed., N.Y.U. Press 1994); and TOM BING-
HAM, THE RULE OF LAW (Penguin 2010).  See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an
Essentially Contested Concept (In Florida)?, in THE RULE OF LAW AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
154 (Richard Bellamy ed., Ashgate 2005).
86. FULLER, supra note 9, at 214.
87. Sa´nchez-Cuenca, Power, Rules, and Compliance, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF
LAW 69 (Jose´ Marı´a Maravall & Adam Przeworski eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003).
88. T.R.S. Allan, The Rule of Law as the Rule of Reason: Consent and Constitutionalism,
115 L.Q. REV. 221 (1999).
89. For arguments about the close connections between the rule of law and the
latter three political ideals, see, e.g., FRIEDRICH HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: VOL-
UME 1: RULES AND ORDER (Univ. of Chicago Press 1973); Richard Epstein, Property Rights
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law is the specific excellence of law, allowing it to achieve whatever pur-
poses a society chooses to put it to.  The specific excellence of knives, by
analogy, is sharpness:90 whether a knife is used to chop vegetables or
commit murder, it will do neither well unless it is sharp.  A carpenter
will do better in constructing buildings when his tools are sharp,
whether those buildings are orphanages or hideouts for thieves.91
A content-free conception of the rule of law is one that accepts that
whatever purposes laws have those purposes will be more effectively
achieved if the legal system upholds the principles of the rule of law.
Economic and social rights and clearly articulated statutory goals of
social justice can, in principle, be translated into rules that confine and
direct government action just as easily as any other set of substantive
commitments.  The idea of normative congruence accepts that the rule
of law does not carry any inherent substantive content, but insists that
in those circumstances where a legal system or a statutory framework is
committed to a set of normative principles or foundations, the conduct
of officials and agencies must be congruent not only with formal rules
for conduct but also with these normative principles.  The principle of
normative congruence has two components.
The first is the idea that where social (or other) legislation is
animated by a set of normative commitments, the statutory and regula-
tory rules for official conduct must bear a connection to this normative
foundation.  There must be a rational connection between the formal
terms of the rules that govern official behavior and the normative com-
mitments that underlie the regulatory project.  Compliance with the
rules, in other words, must tend toward the fulfillment of the project’s
normative commitments.  Where rules are not closely connected to
these normative foundations, official conduct may be incongruent with
the normative elements of social legislation even though it is not incon-
gruent with the formal rules themselves.
The second component is that officials charged with implementing
the rules for the realization of economic and social rights must them-
selves have a clear idea of the normative commitments that underlie the
regulatory project.  Every legal framework for the fulfillment of rights
must be implemented at various sites by a handful of institutional
actors.  These include policy-makers at high levels of the executive,
administrators and officials in the bureaucratic machinery of a regula-
tory system, and the courts of review asked to examine the conduct of
these actors.  Where these actors do not share a uniform understanding
of the normative bases of the regulatory system they are involved in
enforcing, or do not share a common understanding of how those nor-
and the Rule of Law: Classical Liberalism Confronts the Modern Administrative State (presented
at the Mont Pelerin Society Conference on The Market Economy in the Welfare State,
Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.mps2009.org/files/Epstein.pdf; RICHARD EPSTEIN, DESIGN FOR
LIBERTY: PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, AND THE RULE OF LAW (Harvard
Univ. Press 2011); and Ronald Cass, Property Rights Systems and the Rule of Law, SSRN ELEC-
TRONIC PAPER COLLECTIONS, http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=392783.
90. Raz, supra note 85, at 225–26. R
91. FULLER, supra note 9, at 153.
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mative principles inform and infuse specific rules for official conduct,
courts may find that official conduct is inconsistent with governing or
empowering law.  Circumstances of official intransigence, incompe-
tence, or inattentiveness, on the basis of which Young’s catalytic court
will select an appropriate type of judicial review, result from varying
degrees of normative incongruence between official understandings of
law and the law’s normative foundations.
A legal system’s normative commitments stand as a guide to institu-
tional action.  A shared and common understanding of how normative
commitments do in fact guide action is important to ensuring that the
full range of public efforts in following rules and implementing social
legislation is oriented to the same core objectives.  The value of a legal
system’s “visionary unity,” Frank Michelman argues,
is the value of having all the institutional sites in which the legal
order resides . . . pulling in the same and not contrary directions,
working in ultimate harmony (which is not to say without differ-
ence and debate) toward the vision (the elements of which must
always be open to interpretation) of a well-ordered . . . society
depicted in very broad-brush fashion by [its] founding values.92
2. Achieving Normative Congruence: Dynamic Regulatory
Constitutionalism in Action
Judicial processes and court orders that foster visionary unity or
normative congruence across the legal system, from the constitution all
the way through to the coalface of regulatory and administrative action,
hold the promise of driving the administrative fulfillment of economic
and social rights.  A number of court decisions around the world stand
as examples of the effective employment of dynamic regulatory consti-
tutionalism as a mechanism of leveraging one or the other of the
existing models of rights enforcement toward normative congruence
and more effective fulfillment of economic and social rights.  At the
same time, however, there are examples of judgments in cases com-
plaining of failures to fulfill economic and social rights that do not gen-
erate unity (or fail to overcome disunity) as to the constitutional
foundations of regulatory rules.  In the sections that follow I describe
cases in Colombia, Argentina, South Africa, and the United States as
examples of both dynamic regulatory constitutionalism, and as exam-
ples of missed opportunities to rely on dynamic regulatory constitution-
alism to move the administrative state toward normative congruence.
a. Colombia’s Displaced Person’s Case
In Colombia, two Constitutional Court cases have imposed exten-
sive structural injunctions in efforts to end systematic non-fulfillment of
economic and social rights.  The Displaced Persons case has been far
92. Frank I. Michelman, The Rule of Law, Legality and the Supremacy of the Constitution,
in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 37–38 (S. Woolman et al. eds., Juta 2d ed.
2005) (describing in particular the implications of the commitment to the rule of law in
South Africa’s Constitution).
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more successful in bringing structural changes to government regula-
tion than the Health Care case, however.  The Displaced Persons case was a
response to the crisis of internally displaced persons (IDPs) caused by
Colombia’s long-running civil violence and armed opposition.  Without
an adequate state response to their plight, IDPs’ rights to a decent life,
personal integrity, health, social security, and education are all
threatened, on a massive scale and in a prolonged and ongoing man-
ner.93  The source of these violations is not the conduct of a single
entity or institution, but the structural problems that affect the entirety
of the state’s policy response.94  In 2004, the Colombian Constitutional
Court responded to a tutela seeking a declaration that this constituted
an unconstitutional state of affairs, specifying the minimum levels of
protection owed to internally displaced persons and the state’s corre-
sponding duties in protecting threatened rights, and ordering the
action to be taken in guaranteeing these rights.95  The Court was thus
asked to issue a structural injunction to remedy the unconstitutional
state of affairs resulting from inadequate state policy and thereby pro-
tect the minimum levels of a range of economic and social rights.
The Displaced Persons case was not the first time the courts had dealt
with internal displacement.  The Constitutional Court itself had found
violations of the rights of IDPs on seventeen previous occasions.  Each
of these orders resulted in a remedy narrowly tailored to the particular
rights violations in each case.  While these remedies may have brought
relief to the individual complainants in each case, the large scale of
internal displacement and the frequent and persistent resort to the
Court for assistance under the tutela cried out for a more fundamental
and structural response to the problem.  In one of these earlier deci-
sions, the Court flagged the need to “tilt the political agenda” in the
direction of solving the problem of internal displacement, as a matter
of priority.96
The Court recognized that the state was not responsible for the
situation of internal displacement but that it nevertheless bore a consti-
tutional obligation to protect the rights of those affected and adopt an
appropriate policy response.97  In working out the levels of protection
that the rights in the Constitution obliged the state to provide with
respect to IDPs, as a class of people whose rights were specifically
threatened, the Court relied extensively on Colombia’s international
law obligations and in particular the UN’s “Guiding Principles on Dis-
placed Persons.”98  The Court infused constitutional economic and
social rights with content on the basis of these international principles
and used this fuller understanding of constitutional rights to engage
93. Sentencia T-025/04, supra note 11, § 2.2.
94. Id. § 5.2.
95. Id. § 2.1.
96. See id. § 5.2.
97. Id., § 6.
98. Commission on Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998), http://daccessods.un.org/access.nsf/
Get?Open&DS=E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2&Lang=E.
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with the state in developing a structural—rather than an individual-
ized—response to the rights violations suffered by IDPs.
The Court’s method of engagement with the state was innovative; it
embarked on a process of gathering information from the government
in order to assess the state of its policy responses to the problem.  The
Court did this by ordering several of the state agencies and institutions
implicated in responding to internal displacement to respond to a ques-
tionnaire regarding their respective approaches to IDPs.  In analyzing
the government’s responses, the Court’s aim was to determine whether
features or omissions in the design, implementation, monitoring, or
evaluation of state policy had contributed significantly to official blind-
ness to the rights violations experienced by IDPs.99  The Court’s conclu-
sion, on the basis of the evidence supplied by the state, was that official
policy was essentially on the right track and had in recent years made
considerable efforts towards reducing the numbers of IDPs and mitigat-
ing the rights-infringing consequences of internal displacement.  It was
further apparent from the state’s responses to the Court’s request for
information that the state was committed to addressing the problems of
internal displacement.  The Colombian state thus shared the Constitu-
tion’s vision of protecting a vulnerable group of people—i.e., IDPs—
from the consequence of inadequate access to socio-economic
resources.
The root cause of the structural problem, then, was not the lack of
a shared vision of the Constitution’s normative commitments, but an
inability on the part of policymakers to translate that vision into an
effective policy response.  In addressing this policy failure, the Court’s
judgment focused the government’s attention on the principles
encoded in the “Guiding Principles.”  Reference to these principles
provided direction and structure to the state’s policy response, in two
ways.  First, it highlighted the need for the state to gather information
about the socio-economic needs of IDPs.  What the policy response was
missing was a set of indicators or benchmarks according to which the
neediest individuals could be identified and their situations addressed.
Second, and more generally, the principles directed the state towards
an understanding of how constitutional rights are to be interpreted in
the context of IDPs, and what level of material provision or minimum
standards those rights guarantee for people in situations of internal dis-
placement.  The Court’s order ultimately included an instruction to the
state to establish subsidy programs to meet the basic health, food, and
shelter needs of IDPs.100
This case is an outstanding example of dynamic regulatory consti-
tutionalism in action.  In the first place, the Court assessed the state’s
existing policy response to a situation of ongoing rights violations in
light of a set of instructions, in the form of international legal princi-
ples, about how to deal with that specific problem.  These principles
provided the substantive criteria against which state policy was evalu-
99. Sentencia T-025/04, supra note 11, § 6.
100. Landau, supra note 3, at 226. R
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ated, and the Court’s order for the state to establish subsidy programs
was influenced by these principles.  Second, the dynamic process by
which the Court sought to gain an understanding of the state’s policy
position demonstrates a commitment to assessing the state of official
understanding of the core constitutional commitment to social justice
and to ensuring that officials share with the Constitution, legislators
and the Court itself, a vision of the substantive objectives of the cata-
logue of economic and social rights as they affect IDPs.
b. Colombia’s Health Care Decision
The Court’s attempt to rely on a similar model of adjudication in
regard to Colombia’s health care system, however, was undermined by
the government’s active opposition to the vision of public health
embedded in the Constitution and the Court’s failure to assert more
clearly the Constitution’s vision of health care.  In 1993, Colombia laid
the statutory foundation for a national health care system.  Law 100 pro-
vided for a private health insurance scheme, closely regulated by the
state.  Regulators were to set rates, define deductibles and premiums,
set the content of packages and benefits, and define who was eligible
for coverage.101  Fifteen years after its passage, the health care system
still fell short of the details set out in the legislation.  Many of the bene-
fits clearly set out in the law were simply not being provided to people,
unless an order of court had compelled officials to do so.  In addition,
officials had not specified levels of benefits mandated by the legislation
nor outlined the state’s obligations to provide health care services.
These “grey zones” left individuals with no sense of the level of health
care they were entitled to.102  In 2008 alone, over 140,000 tutelas for the
protection of the right to health were filed in the courts, with the
majority of these claims relating to health treatments and services that
should have been provided under Law 100.103  The problem with
health care in Colombia was that the legal rules for the provision of
health care were simply not being complied with, and courts were being
relied on to an unbearably large degree to compel compliance with the
law in individual cases.
In 2008, the Constitutional Court embarked on a project to reform
the health care system and eliminate the structural causes of non-com-
pliance with the health care legislation.  It began in much the same way
as it did in the Displaced Persons case, gathering information from the
state and private health services providers on their respective health
care efforts.104  There are two elements of the judgment that are rele-
vant to an assessment in light of dynamic regulatory constitutionalism.
The first is that the Court did order a series of structural changes to the
health care system, some of which were little more than a restatement
of injunctions contained in the legislation.  For example, Law 100 estab-
101. Yamin & Parra-Vera, supra note 25, at 433. R
102. Id. at 435.
103. Id. at 436, 443.
104. Id. at 445–46.
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lished two tiers of health care insurance—a contributory scheme and a
subsidized scheme—with different levels of coverage.  The law envis-
aged that the two tiers would be amalgamated into a single comprehen-
sive health care system, with similar benefits available to all participants
of the scheme.105  By 2008, this had still not been done, so the Court
ordered the national Commission on Health Regulation to take the
necessary steps to unify the two tiers of health coverage, and to do so
according to a unification plan that was transparent, participatory, and
based on relevant indicators and benchmarks.106  The Court also
ordered the Commission to update the benefits included in the
scheme, immediately and annually, through a process inclusive of the
views of the medical community and health care consumers.107
Although these changes were ordered without a declaration of a
state of unconstitutional affairs,108 the Court made clear that the foun-
dation of its order was the need to bring to an end a situation in which
the institutions of state responsible for health care provision had failed
to put in place a system for the effective realization of the right to
health without recourse to the tutela.109
The second relevant aspect of the judgment is the way the Court
chose to emphasize the rights that the structural reforms of the system
were meant to fulfill.  The Court reiterated its earlier declaration that
economic and social rights entitle people to a level of provision that
guarantees a vital minimum.110  The right to health care, in turn, con-
tains an essential core that is guaranteed to all persons on an immedi-
ately enforceable basis, while the non-core elements of the right are
subject to progressive realization.111  The Court thus adopts the UN
CESCR’s minimum core approach and implies that the health care sys-
tem must, no matter what else it does, prove capable of fulfilling this
core content.  The minimum core content of the right to health thus
becomes the evaluative standard by which the state’s health care plan is
to be assessed for its constitutional acceptability.
The Court did not follow through with this apparent embrace of
the minimum core doctrine, however, because it refrained from giving
any indication of what the essential core of the right to health is.112
Instead, it left it to a “broad public dialogue” to establish the contours
of the essential core.  In doing so, however, the Court gave no indica-
tion of the normative principles that should guide this dialogue.
Dynamic regulatory constitutionalism requires that the dialogue or
engagement between courts, government, and society proceed on the
basis of some account of the normative foundations on which the regu-
latory endeavor rests and to which the programmatic realization of
105. Landau, supra note 3, at 224; Yamin & Parra-Vera, supra note 25, at 446–47. R
106. Sentencia T-760/08, supra note 24, § 6.1
107. Id.
108. Yamin & Parra-Vera, supra note 25, at 446. R
109. Sentencia T-760/08, supra note 24, § 2.2.
110. See Sentencia T-426/92, supra note 55. R
111. Sentencia T-760/08, supra note 24, § 3.
112. Id. § 3.5.2.
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rights should be directed.  In this case, by emptying the right to health
of all content and leaving the determination of its essential, minimum
content to processes of public debate, the Court left a vacuum open to
any number of competing norms.  By opening the right to health up to
public definition without setting any normative parameters to that pro-
cess, the Court abdicated its obligation to articulate and maintain a
focus on the constitutional norms rights express.
As it happened, the process of public definition of the right to
health was hijacked by the government and by the health services prov-
iders, unsurprisingly resulting in a reformulated health care system
unresponsive to individual health needs.  The medical community is
made up of extremely well organized and largely self-interested health
care corporations.  The consumers of health care, on the other hand,
are a non-organized mass of individuals, with few economic means and
mostly with no access to the information needed to formulate coherent
submissions about the content of a right to health.113  Public debate
about rights between these two groups reflected this imbalance in
power and allowed health care providers themselves to determine the
content of rights likely to be asserted against them.
More concerning still was the response of the government itself.
After declaring a state of social emergency, President Alvaro Uribe
issued decrees filling in the gaps in the health care system, circum-
venting Court-ordered public debate.  What is worse, the decrees lim-
ited access to specialized care, reduced the grounds for the
enforcement of the right to health through the tutela, and created a
technical body to determine medical necessity within the context of the
concept of a vital minimum, removing this decision from the control of
attending doctors.114  The Constitutional Court later ruled that Uribe’s
declaration of a state of emergency and his subsequent decrees were
unconstitutional,115 but the full impact of the government’s attempts to
define the right to health narrowly has yet to be seen.
The principle of dynamic regulatory constitutionalism requires
that, at the very least, courts make clear the constitutional commitments
at which government conduct in pursuing rights must be aimed.  While
the process of articulating these commitments may be one of dialogue
and engagement between the branches of government, it would seem
to be a mistake for the courts to withdraw from this process entirely and
leave the government and its agents a blank slate on which to inscribe
the normative content of economic and social rights.  In the Health Care
decision, the government’s ultimate non-compliance with the Court’s
structural injunctions can be explained as a function of the fact that the
government was allowed the room to commit itself to a set of normative
objectives that are different from those underlying the structural
changes the Court ordered.
113. Yamin & Parra-Vera, supra note 25, at 455–56. R
114. Id. at 453.
115. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], abril 16, 2010, Sentencia
C-252/10 (Colom.), http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2010/c-252-10
.htm.
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c. Argentina’s Benghalensis Litigation
The Benghalensis litigation in the mid-1990s in Argentina was an
attempt to hold the government to the provisions of a 1990 statute (Law
23,798) setting out the foundations of a national response to the
scourge of HIV/AIDS.116  The statute made the broad declaration that
the fight against HIV/AIDS was a national priority, but, more specifi-
cally, mandated the establishment of a comprehensive national policy
for treating and preventing the disease and appointed the national
department of health to implement the law and coordinate the efforts
of provincial health departments.117  The legislation was, however,
incompletely implemented in the years immediately following its pas-
sage.  The personnel of the national health care administration were
split into two groups: those eager to establish a comprehensive national
HIV/AIDS policy, and those opposed to both official recognition of the
disease and policy efforts to address it.118  This normative disunity was
due partly to President Carlos Menem’s Vatican-friendly social conser-
vatism,119 and partly to the fiscal conservatism required by World Bank
structural adjustment programs and the Inter-American Development
Bank.120  Rather than increasing public health spending, the Menem
government privatized and decentralized health care.  Despite the pas-
sage of national framework legislation focusing national attention to
HIV/AIDS and mandating a comprehensive national policy response to
it, by the mid-1990s there was no national policy in place and the fight
against the disease could not be said to be a priority of public spending.
The “ideological blockage” to the implementation of the legisla-
tion was a result of the competing normative considerations driving the
government officials charged with implementing the legislation.  The
political objectives the government was intent on pursuing were quite
opposed to those set out in the legislation in the first place.  The
Benghalensis case was accordingly filed by a collective of lawyers, civil
society groups, and activists to compel government compliance with
Law 23,798, relying heavily on a right to health and corresponding state
obligations introduced by Argentina’s 1994 constitutional reforms.
The courts’ responses were consistent with dynamic regulatory con-
stitutionalism.  Judgments were driven by the desire to remove the ideo-
logical blockages driving the state away from fulfilling constitutional
commitments, and to refocus official energy on the constitutional foun-
dations of Law 23,798.  The first court order was issued less than a week
after the matter was first heard, ordering the national health depart-
ment to provide viral load tests and ARV treatment within 48 hours.
This temporary injunction was subsequently confirmed by the trial
court and upheld by two superior courts.  In the final hearing of the
matter in the Supreme Court of Argentina, the Court affirmed the view
116. Law No. 23798, Sept. 14, 1990, [26972] B.O. 2 (Arg.).
117. See Bergallo, supra note 31, at 1620.
118. Id. at 1621.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1622.
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that Law 23,798 was based on the foundation of the right to health,
acknowledged the fundamental nature of the right to health itself, and
pointed out the interconnections between the right to life and the right
to health.  Finally, the Court indicated how an interpretation of rights
and the rules set out in Law 23,798 defined the government’s duty to
adopt a comprehensive and coordinated national plan for the treat-
ment of HIV/AIDS.121  The Supreme Court, here, demonstrated an
awareness of both of the components of normative congruence;
namely, congruence between social legislation outlining government’s
obligations and underlying constitutional norms, and congruence
between official conduct and the constitutional foundations of social
legislation.
While the courts’ structural orders for compliance with the terms
of Law 23,798 had an immediate effect on the applicants seeking access
to HIV/AIDS treatment, the broader and more long-lasting impact was
in bringing normative coherence to state policy.  The political agenda
shifted in the wake of the litigation towards an acknowledgment of
HIV/AIDS as a matter of national priority.  The administrative resis-
tance to the adoption of a policy could no longer be sustained in light
of a Supreme Court decision affirming the connections between funda-
mental constitutional rights and the statutorily mandated national
HIV/AIDS treatment program.  As political priorities shifted, the
budget allocation to HIV/AIDS grew from $19 million to $70 million in
1998, and the program expanded from Buenos Aires across the
country.
The structural orders in the Benghalensis litigation were under-
girded by a clear expression of the links between constitutional rights to
health and life, fundamental national commitments to combatting
HIV/AIDS, and the terms of Law 23,798.  In making these links clear,
the courts were able to reorient national political ideologies and priori-
ties towards Argentina’s commitment to health care.  The success of the
court’s structural interventions thus occurred in the context of a suc-
cessful realignment of official priorities with the relevant law’s underly-
ing normative commitments.
The post-Benghalensis litigation was far less successful, however.
After the new HIV/AIDS legislation was in place, declaring the fight
against the disease as a national priority and setting measures to be
taken in that fight, claims that the state had failed to provide the level
of service set out in the law continued to come to the courts.  This sec-
ond generation of HIV/AIDS litigation turned on more straightforward
complaints of non-compliance with existing law and policy on the part
of the government and its administrative officials.  Representative of
this wave of litigation was the AV case, which sought an order of court
compelling the continued provision of ARVs despite the economic
121. Asociacio´n Benghalensis y Otros, supra note 31, at pt. V.
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chaos that hit Argentina in 2001–2002.122  The court upheld these
claims, issuing injunctions requiring the provision of ARVs to the com-
plainants according to the terms of the legislation and national regula-
tory framework.  As increasing numbers of people found the public
supply of ARVs drying up, the courts issued increasing numbers of
injunctions.  Indeed, health care officials advised patients to approach
the courts for injunctions in order to get ARVs.  As in Colombia, access
to health care under the framework legislation became impossible with-
out the assistance of the courts and an individualized injunction.123
These cases persisted until at least 2010.124  Judgments in these
matters made no attempt to account for the persistence of non-compli-
ance with the terms of the HIV/AIDS law.  Instead, approached as sim-
ple cases of non-compliance with the terms of legislation and HIV/
AIDS treatment policy, the judgments did no more than require offi-
cials to adhere to the formal content of the previously declared rules.
In turn, officials adhered to these rules only once ordered to do so by
the court.  The result was a situation in which the constitutional right to
health, translated into a statutory entitlement to anti-retroviral medica-
tion, was threatened or infringed but for the intervention of the courts.
The systemic causes for these violations of rights were never considered
nor addressed, and as a result, the violation of rights continued except
in those cases where individuals were able to win an injunction from the
courts.
In this second generation of HIV/AIDS litigation in Argentina, the
courts’ failure to do anything more than order formal compliance with
regulatory rules, or to look into the underlying causes of persistent non-
compliance with legislation, resulted in a situation of long-standing reg-
ulatory recalcitrance and judicial enmeshment in the provision of
health care services.  A judicial strategy based on dynamic regulatory
constitutionalism would have led the courts to engage with officials in
an effort to understand whether the reasons for persistent non-compli-
ance was perhaps a similar ideological blockage, not in the executive
branch but among the administrative officials responsible for imple-
menting the law. The process of engagement might reveal, on the other
hand, that while there is a shared vision of the constitutional impera-
tives of the regulatory framework, the impediment to effective realiza-
tion of these imperatives is something like the lack of resources.
Without an approach based on dynamic regulatory constitutionalism,
however, the courts may not make these discoveries.
d. New York State Courts
In the United States, the New York Court of Appeals case dealing
with the state’s obligation under the New York State Constitution to
122. Juzgado Nacional de Primera Instancia en lo Civil y Comercial, Sala II [1a
Inst.][Federal Court of First Instance in Civil and Commercial Matters], 27/2/2004, “A.V.
y otros c. Ministerio de Salud de la Nacio´n / amparo,” Expte. No. 3223/02 (Arg).
123. Bergallo, supra note 31, at 1634–35.
124. Id. at 1635.
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ensure adequate compensation for judges, highlighted the need for
government action to adhere to the state’s constitutional commitments:
“When this Court articulates the constitutional standards governing
state action, we presume that the State will act accordingly.”125  Even
though the right to judicial compensation is only tangentially an eco-
nomic and social right (and more a question of separation of powers),
the court’s expression of the principle of shared vision and institutional
unity is important.  Moreover, the principle has been relied on by state
courts in adjudicating the economic and social rights included in state
constitutions.  In cases dealing with the state constitutional rights to
free, adequate, or substantially equal public education, for example,
state courts have increasingly focused on whether public school systems
provide an education that meets the demands of contemporary society.
The constitutional standard is “the adequacy of outcome,” not “the
equality of inputs.”126  Reorienting officials to the former standard,
rather than the latter, is part of the judicial effort in these cases to
ensure that regulatory efforts are sensitive to the substantive objectives
at the heart of state constitutional rights to education and thus more
likely to ensure the longer-term regulatory fulfillment of rights to
education.
In McCain v. Koch,127 the New York Supreme Court paid close
attention to the welfare clause in the New York State Constitution and
the provisions of New York’s Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Act in order to describe the obligations that state officials bore to home-
less families.  The Court’s approach is consistent with the idea of nor-
mative congruence, since the evaluative standard for the state’s
obligation to provide shelter comes from close attention to the statutory
framework, and not from a contextually unmoored exegesis of the con-
stitutional right alone.  On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals con-
firmed that the courts do indeed have the power to set minimal
standards for the achievement of statutorily imposed obligations to pro-
vide shelter, provided that they are fashioned as a temporary measure
until the legislature adopts its own minimum standards.128  The basis of
these interim minimum standards, the court held, was the common law
requirement of habitability.129  Once formal minimum standards are
set, there can be no question that the state can be held by the courts to
their terms.130
125. Maron v. Silver, 925 N.E.2d 899, 915 (N.Y. 2010).
126. James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined:
The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
183, 205 (2003). See, e.g., Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996); Rose v. Council
for Better Education, 790 S.W.2d 186 (K.Y. 1989); Connecticut Coalition for Justice in
Education Funding Inc v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206 (Conn. 2010); and Horton v. Meskill, 376
A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977) (for state cases relying on a more normatively grounded concep-
tion of adequate education).
127. McCain v. Koch, 484 N.Y.S. 2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
128. Id. at 923.
129. Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 2, at 951–52. R
130. McCain, 484 N.Y.S. 2d at 923.
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There are two elements of the court’s approach here that align it
with dynamic regulatory constitutionalism, both of which are rooted in
the court’s attention to the background legal framework for state
action.  First, the obligation to provide a minimum standard is not free-
standing but is rather a result of the legislation requiring aid to families
with dependent children.  This federal statutory obligation, combined
with the state obligation under the welfare clause to provide assistance
to the needy, imposes the obligation on the state to provide emergency
shelter for families and, with that obligation firmly embedded in this
combined reading of the state constitution and federal legislation, to
provide shelter of a minimally acceptable standard.
Second, the court identified the standards of “minimal habitabil-
ity” in the common law, itself an expression of the “standards which this
society at this time finds acceptable within the meaning of the word
shelter.”  In this case the common law, rather than legislation, played
the critical role in defining the standard of shelter to which a right to
welfare could be said to commit the state to providing.  The Court drew
from positive law, rather than some inherent minimum core content of
economic and social rights, in adopting an interim standard of minimal
shelter pending the formal promulgation of rules for the provision of
shelter.  As it turned out, once the formal rules were adopted they were
more stringent than the court’s rules.131
e. South Africa’s Engagement Orders
In Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg, a city policy committed to
deliver 6,000 liters of water per household per month, free of charge.  A
number of residents in one of Johannesburg’s poorest suburbs chal-
lenged the policy as irrational, unreasonable, and in violation of the
state’s obligation in terms of section 27(2) of the constitution to take
“reasonable” steps to fulfill the right to water.  The basis of the com-
plaint was that each household was given the same quantity of free
water, regardless of how many people lived there.  The Constitutional
Court rejected the challenge and upheld the City’s water policy, finding
that it fell “within the bounds of reasonableness and therefore [was]
not in conflict with either section 27 of the constitution or with the
national legislation regulating water services.”132
In adjudicating the matter, the Constitutional Court concerned
itself only with the question of whether the City’s plan for delivering
water to the people of Johannesburg demonstrated an appropriate
understanding of the constitutional foundations of the regulatory sys-
tem.  The City, moreover, proved to be an engaged and committed
partner in the project of rights-fulfillment, supplying extensive evidence
of its policymaking process to the court.  Although the court admitted
that the City’s “comprehensive and persistent engagement” in this
regard may have been spurred by the litigation, the result was nonethe-
131. Id.
132. Mazibuko and Others v. City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 5
para. 9 (S. Afr.).
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less that the City had taken steps, in response to citizen reliance on
constitutional rights, to conform its policy to the constitution.133  On
the basis of the evidence provided by the City, the court concluded that
the City’s policy actions were based on an acceptable understanding of
the constitutional principles at the heart of the regulatory system.  That
understanding, moreover, was shared by other institutional actors in
the regulatory system, most obviously legislators, subordinate rule mak-
ers, and the judges themselves.  The court did not make an attempt to
step into the shoes of the administrators and policy-makers and formu-
late either a comprehensive water delivery policy or stipulate an
amount of water that the City must provide to each citizen or house-
hold.  In confining itself to the question of whether the City’s conduct
was driven by a constitutionally acceptable understanding of the objec-
tives of the regulatory endeavor, the Court focused on the “administra-
tive issues” rather than the “technical” ones.134  This response is an
example of dynamic regulatory constitutionalism.
In other decisions, the Constitutional Court’s insistence on engage-
ment has come at the expense of a focus on constitutional values.
Engagement orders were made in three cases from the same era as
Mazibuko, twice involving eviction from public land and buildings
(Olivia Road135 and Joe Slovo136) and once in a matter involving the clo-
sure of temporary refugee camps (Mamba137).  In Olivia Road and Joe
Slovo, groups of people were occupying buildings and land owned by
public authorities.  In both cases, the public authorities concerned
sought the eviction of the occupiers because they wanted to redevelop
the land for urban renewal projects.  The relevant legislation, the Pre-
vention of Illegal Eviction and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act of
1998 (the PIE Act), requires evictions to happen only on the order of a
court.  In Olivia Road the Johannesburg High Court issued an injunc-
tion prohibiting eviction, while in Joe Slovo the Cape Town High Court
granted an eviction order.  Both cases were appealed to the Constitu-
tional Court.  In both cases, the Constitutional Court ordered the pub-
lic authorities to “engage meaningfully” with the occupiers to ensure
that the occupiers were not left homeless by eviction, and that their
constitutional rights to housing were protected.  In Olivia Road, the
court’s engagement order directed the parties to have regard to “the
values of the Constitution” in coming up with a solution,138 and
although the settlement ultimately agreed to by the parties was hailed
as a success, this was in large part due to the fact that the City had, by
the time the case was litigated in the Constitutional Court, abandoned
133. Id. at 48 para. 96.
134. R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR
ACT 388 (Brookings 1983).
135. Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township v. City of Johannesburg 2008 (5) BCLR
475 (CC) (S. Afr.).
136. Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v. Thubelisha Homes and Others 2010
(3) SA 454 (CC) (S. Afr).
137. Mamba v. Minister of Social Development, unreported, CCT 65/08 (S. Afr.).
138. Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township v. City of Johannesburg 2008 (5) BCLR
475 (CC) at 5 para. 1 (S. Afr.).
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the practice of evicting people from inner city buildings as part of its
redevelopment policy.139
In Joe Slovo, the Court upheld the eviction order, but nevertheless
ordered the public authorities involved to engage meaningfully with
the evictees in order to ensure adequate alternative housing.  Since the
proposed development in this case would have affected 20,000 people,
the Court imposed a strict timetable for engagement and set guidelines
for the substance of the engagement.140  Reaction to this order was
ambivalent at best, with several commentators critical of the court’s lack
of attention to the substance of the right and the flexibility afforded to
the public authorities in complying with the engagement order.141
The third case, Mamba, involved the government’s response to a
wave of xenophobic attacks on foreigners during 2008.  Temporary
shelters were established to house people displaced by these attacks, but
when after only a short while the government announced plans to close
these shelters, the residents of the camps approached the courts for
relief.  The Constitutional Court, in a very brief judgment that is not
reported in the law reports, made an order in substantially similar terms
to that in Olivia Road.  The outcome was vastly different to Olivia Road,
however, as the government simply began closing camps, interpreting
the engagement order as requiring nothing more than informing camp
residents of the camps’ imminent closure.
As a mechanism or model for the enforcement of economic and
social rights, engagement orders will remain disconnected from the
constitutional foundations of rights unless courts emphasize the sub-
stantive objectives to which engagement must be directed.  In Mazibuko,
the court was called on to decide whether the City’s decision to provide
a certain monthly amount of water to each household free of charge
was “reasonable” within the meaning of the constitutional right to have
access to sufficient water.  The City’s policy obligations already articu-
lated the substantive parameters within which the City’s conduct was to
be assessed, and there was no complaint that the City had failed to meet
these parameters.  The only question to be answered was whether the
City’s positive, substantive commitments were congruent with the
underlying constitutional commitment to provide access to sufficient
water.
Without a clear articulation of substantive commitments in positive
law, or a clear statement by a court of the substantive limits and pur-
poses of engagement between the public and government, a court
order that the state engage with the people may allow the state to com-
ply with the order while nevertheless avoiding constitutional obligations
and undermining constitutional rights.  The flexibility that engagement
139. Brian Ray, Residents of Joe Slovo Community v Thubelisha Homes and
Others: The Two Faces of Engagement, 10 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 360, 368 (2010).
140. Id. at 365–66; see also Brian Ray, Extending the Shadow of the Law: Using Hybrid
Mechanisms to Develop Constitutional Norms in Socioeconomic Rights Cases, UTAH L. REV. 797,
834–35 (2009).
141. See, e.g., SANDRA LIEBENBERG, SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: ADJUDICATION UNDER A
TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTION 308–311 (Juta 2010).
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affords, and the indeterminacy of the engagement process, might well
mean that an engagement order becomes a “meaningless platitude.”142
The Mamba case serves as a warning of this possibility.  In Olivia Road,
the City came around to a similar vision of the right to housing as both
the PIE Act and the Constitutional Court, in spite of the Court’s failure
to articulate that vision as a guiding principle of engagement.
Engagement orders create a process by which state officials can be
led towards an understanding of the constitutional foundations of the
regulatory schemes they are mandated to implement, and to develop
policies that are sensitive to constitutional obligations.  Where the
courts do not maintain the focus on underlying constitutional commit-
ments and ensure that the process of engagement is inflected by these
commitments, there is little reason to believe that the outcome of the
engagement process will advance commitments to economic and social
rights.  As a strategy of economic and social rights enforcement,
engagement orders will be significantly strengthened by the focus on
normativity that dynamic regulatory constitutionalism brings to consti-
tutional adjudication.
3. The Importance of Congruence
These examples show that a lack of shared vision is not only a viola-
tion of the principle of congruence and thus of the rule of law, but may
also lead to a failure to consistently achieve the objectives of social legis-
lation.  Enforcing the requirement of normative congruence as a fuller
conception of the rule of law has the benefit of fostering unity around a
vision of the regulatory project and improving the likelihood that offi-
cial pursuit of economic and social rights will uphold the reasons for
which we value those rights in the first place.  Moreover, the idea of
normative congruence provides a standard against which to evaluate
and assess official conduct in realizing rights.  It fills the evaluative gap
in the existing models of economic and social rights adjudication and
avoids the problems of regulatory formalism that come from a mechani-
cal and normatively unmoored implementation of regulatory rules.
Filling that gap, however, requires focus on positive law–whether in the
form of social legislation as in South Africa and Argentina, the common
law as in New York, or a country’s international law commitments as in
Colombia.  Positive law of this kind proves a crucial link in both the
project of fulfilling the constitutional commitment to economic and
social rights and in articulating the substantive criteria against which
the congruence of official conduct can be assessed.
To add substance to the idea of normative congruence, it is worth
locating its roots in Fuller’s own conception of the rule of law.  The
important point in this respect is the distinction Fuller draws between
rules understood as a form of managerial control, and law understood
as a mechanism of regulating the exercise of power.143  The former is a
142. Ray, supra note 139, at 367 (quoting Sandra Liebenberg, Joe Slovo Eviction: Vul- R
nerable Community Feels the Law from the Top Down, BUSINESS DAY (June 22, 2009)).
143. FULLER, supra note 9, at 207.
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means by which a subordinate is directed toward accomplishing the
tasks a superior wants accomplished, while the latter establishes a differ-
ent sort of relationship between law-giver and subject.  While a manage-
rial superior gives orders that her subordinates follow in order to
achieve a specific task, the citizens of a law-bounded society obey the
laws as they pursue their own plans and conduct their own lives.  Mana-
gerial directives regulate the relationship between the superior and the
subordinate, but law regulates the multiplicity of relationships between
numerous people.  Law, Fuller says, is not like management.  Govern-
ment does not issue orders that direct citizens to achieve specific tasks,
but rather guarantees the integrity of the system within which citizens
interact with one another.144
The distinction is important.  A principle which demands that “the
actions of the superior conform to the rules he has himself announced”
makes no sense in the management relationship, since managerial
directives cannot bind managers.145  But law binds government as
much as it binds the members of a society governed by law.  Fuller is
less concerned with law as a technology of governance here than with a
consideration of how the law’s binding effect on government affirms a
view of persons as thinking, rational beings: government is limited by
the obligation to explain how its particular laws or acts of political
power are consistent with or justified by previously declared and gen-
eral rules.146  Because law takes individuals to be rational and thinking
beings capable of conforming their behavior to the rules law sets, gov-
ernment’s own acts and decisions must be capable of being justified
and defended to the rational thinking people they affect on the basis of
general principles to which the government is already committed.147
To this I add the idea that where a government acts in ways that do
not advance its previously declared normative commitments, it runs a
similar risk of forfeiting the justificatory basis for its actions.  Where the
rules that govern official behavior are part of a regulatory framework
that is committed to constitutional or policy goals, or which rests on a
substantive conception of justice, the link in the chain of justification
has to be forged with reference to those normative commitments.  Gov-
ernment action that is not congruent with normative commitments, or
144. Id. at 210.
145. Id. at 208.
146. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 78-
79 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1958); MAX WEBER, MAX
WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 9 (Max Rheinstein & Edward A. Shils eds.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1954). The legitimation of government action and laws through
rational explanation on the basis of formally declared rules fits quite comfortably into
Max Weber’s formal legal rationality as a “basic legitimation” or “inner justification” of
power.
147. Allan, supra note 88, at 231–32.  A similar distinction has been described in the R
South African legal transformation from the authoritarian apartheid state to a constitu-
tional democracy based on human dignity, equality and freedom. See Etienne Mureinik,
A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 31 (1994); see
also David Dyzenhaus, Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception of Legal Culture, 14
S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 11 (1998).
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is not justifiable in light of those commitments, is no less a threat to the
rule of law than a failure to act in terms of the formal rules a govern-
ment declares beforehand.  The normative extension to the principle
of congruence involves congruence with previously declared rules as
well as with the normative commitments that the previously declared
rules purportedly serve.
B. Social Legislation as a Tool of Intra-Governmental Communication
The shared or common vision of the normative foundations of a
regulatory system, which the second component of the idea of norma-
tive congruence demands, is not a feature or a characteristic of the
rules and principles of a particular society’s laws, but rather a product
of the minds of the people who operate the processes and institutions
of the legal system.  Dynamic regulatory constitutionalism is, at its core,
the project of working out how legislators, policymakers, and officials
understand the constitutional foundations of social legislation, and
ensuring that these institutional actors have as coherent and as closely
shared a vision of these normative foundations as possible.
Along with the first component of the idea of normative congru-
ence, we can begin to see a fuller picture of how the model of dynamic
regulatory constitutionalism defines the role of courts in enforcing
social legislation.  The specific rules that social legislation sets for offi-
cial conduct should be seen against the background of the more
abstract normative commitments that motivate that legislation in the
first place.  The regulatory or statutory prescriptions for official con-
duct, for example, in the provision of water supplies or the provision of
health care services or housing, can be understood as attempts to
achieve broader goals of social justice expressed as rights to sufficient
water, health care, and housing.  The role of the courts in the enforce-
ment of social legislation, then, is to maintain the focus on the norma-
tive commitments that underlie the legislation, both by affirming the
connections between constitutional commitments and rules for official
conduct, and by ensuring officials understand the constitutional foun-
dations of the rules that govern their conduct.148
In this light, social legislation can be understood to fulfill an
important function not only in stating the rules that officials must com-
ply with, but also in communicating fundamental normative commit-
ments to officials.149 While legislation, or law more generally, is often
understood as a tool for regulating society, an alternative understand-
ing is that legislation that imposes limits to executive and administrative
148. Helen Hershkoff takes a similar view of the role that state constitutional eco-
nomic and social rights impose on state courts, arguing that courts are in the business of
ensuring that government uses its powers to move closer to the achievement of the consti-
tutionally prescribed, substantive goals of socio-economic provision. See Hershkoff, Posi-
tive Rights and State Constitutions, supra note 2, at 1138, 1145; see also Helen Hershkoff, R
Welfare Devolution and State Constitutions, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1912–913
(1998–1999).
149. Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 369 (1989).
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power regulates government conduct rather than social behavior.  HLA
Hart takes the former view, seeing law as “a means of social control”
and a “guide to conduct.”150  This is certainly true for criminal law, say,
but legislation empowering administrative agencies and officials is of a
different nature since it applies to public officials rather than private
citizens.151  Legislation dealing with resource allocations and general
policy directives “can only be addressed to administrative agencies” and
are intended primarily to direct and control the behavior of the admin-
istrative branch: it constitutes a set of “internal government instruc-
tions.”152  Indeed, even the decision to include economic and social
rights in a constitution is an instruction to the legislature, limiting cer-
tain kinds of legislation and compelling others.153
Understanding legislation of this type as primarily a tool of intra-
governmental communication, rather than a tool of social control,
shifts the rule-of-law inquiry from one focused on strict adherence to
formal rules to one assessing the efficacy of communication between
legislators and administrative officials and the level of coherence
between their respective understandings of the purposes of legislation.
Where legislation is intended to communicate normative commitments
to officials, and to set the parameters for official conduct, the require-
ment of normative congruence becomes the focal point of adjudica-
tion.  Enforcing social legislation is a matter of maintaining close
oversight of agency action and ensuring that administrative decisions
and actions in terms of legislation remain congruent with the norma-
tive commitments that underlie social legislation, and does not stray
from the formal decision rules set out in the legislation.
The idea of normative congruence and the conception of social
legislation as a tool for intra-governmental communication thus com-
bine to outline a role for the courts in enforcing economic and social
rights and upholding social legislation against officials.  The courts’ pri-
mary objective should be to lead officials toward an understanding of
the normative content of the rules governing their behavior.  This pro-
cess of engagement between courts and officials is dynamic, ongoing,
and iterative.  Courts engage substantively with officials in attempting to
work out whether officials’ understandings of the regulatory system’s
150. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 39, 134 (Oxford Univ. Press 1961).
151. See F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 137 (Univ. of
Chicago Press 1973) (“Much of the greatest part of what is called public law, however,
consists of administrative law, that is the rules regulating the activities of the various
administrative agencies.”). See also Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On
Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). Dan-Cohen distinguishes
between “decision rules” as those that govern the functions officials must perform, and
“conduct rules” which govern private behavior.  He locates the roots of this distinction in
the classical jurisprudence of Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government (quoted by Dan-
Cohen at 626–27).
152. Rubin, supra note 149, at 371, 374. R
153. Hershkoff & Loffredo, State Courts and Constitutional Socio-Economic Rights, supra
note 2, at 929; Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions, supra note 2, at 1156 R
(“These positive rights are not simply structural limits on governmental power; they are
also prescriptive duties compelling government to use such power to achieve constitution-
ally fixed social ends.”).
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normative foundation differs from the other branches’ understandings
of these normative foundations.  Indeed, courts may discover that offi-
cials have no idea of the normative foundations of the rules they are
enjoined to follow.  Identifying points of difference, if any, is a first step
in realigning official conduct under social legislation to the legislation’s
normative objectives and fulfilling the constitutional rights that express
those objectives.
CONCLUSION
In directing courts toward upholding the two components of nor-
mative congruence, dynamic regulatory constitutionalism does not
favor a particular model of economic and social rights enforcement.
Rather, it suggests that whichever model a court chooses to enforce eco-
nomic and social rights, whether structural injunctions, the minimum
core doctrine, the administrative law model, or a catalytic court
approach, the court should ensure that both of the components of nor-
mative congruence are upheld.  Courts should assess, in other words,
whether there is congruence between the formal rules for the pursuit of
economic and social rights and the constitutional foundations of those
rights, and second, whether officials responsible for implementing leg-
islation understand the normative content of the rules that govern their
conduct.
In upholding the first component, courts will strike down as
unconstitutional any legislation that is not congruent with normative
commitments of constitutional economic and social rights.  This is not
a particularly groundbreaking conclusion, since it is uncontroversial to
suggest that courts have the power to strike down legislation when it
infringes constitutional rights.  However, where legislation or regula-
tions encode rules that are not consistent with the constitutional foun-
dations of economic and social rights, government compliance with this
legislation will fail to uphold or advance rights even though it is for-
mally compliant with rules.  The first component of normative congru-
ence highlights the problems of regulatory formalism, pointing out that
formal compliance with rules that are not committed to the normative
project or economic and social rights fulfillment may explain why regu-
latory schemes persistently fail to deliver the promise of economic and
social rights.
The second component of normative congruence extends the
focus on normativity onto the attitudes of officials.  Dynamic regulatory
constitutionalism requires judicial engagement with officials on the
normative substance of their decisions in order to ascertain whether
officials themselves are committed to the project of realizing economic
and social rights.  Where courts find that officials have a markedly dif-
ferent understanding of the regulatory scheme’s normative founda-
tions, or none at all, the courts’ role is to remedy this visionary disunity
and lead officials toward an understanding of precisely how the norma-
tive commitments a legal system expresses in constitutional rights and
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in social legislation inflect and inform the rules that govern official
behavior.
To the extent that the existing models of judicial economic and
social rights enforcement all fail to pay due regard to the importance of
normativity in the enforcement of rules, dynamic regulatory constitu-
tionalism fills a gap in the existing literature.  Dynamic regulatory con-
stitutionalism shares the flexibility of the catalytic court approach,
suggesting that courts adopt whichever model of rights enforcement or
remedy is most appropriate in the circumstances, as long as due regard
is given to the normative foundations of the regulatory endeavor.
Dynamic regulatory constitutionalism offers an interpretive perspective
for judicial engagement with the other branches of government, rather
than a discrete or complete alternative model for the enforcement of
economic and social rights.
The idea of normative congruence requires that whatever a legal
community’s fundamental commitments, the project of maintaining
the exercise of power within the limits of the law must take these funda-
mental commitments into account.  Constitutional economic and social
rights express normative commitments, but are also a manifesto for gov-
ernment action.  Social legislation both communicates normative com-
mitments to officials and sets the public agenda for meeting them.
Judicial review of official conduct for its compliance with this legislation
should be contoured by a commitment to upholding both the formal
rules and the fundamental constitutional values on which they are
based.  Dynamic regulatory constitutionalism allows courts to do so by
participating as a partner with legislators, policymakers, and state offi-
cials in the public project of realizing economic and social rights.
